Abstract
This article examines how the judicial committee and the concept of “supervision” operate to enable and constraint judicial independence in the People’s Republic of China. By allowing the liberal reopening of final judgments, adjudication supervision can ensure justice by allowing the correction of errors but it can also place enormous institutional constraints on individual judicial work. Adjudication supervision reflects the belief that individual judicial work must be subjected to supervision by the masses, legal institutions such as the procuracy, and the state. Ultimately, judicial independence in China means the independence of the court as a whole and not the work of individual judges.
Keywords
Adjudication, judgements
Subject Categories
Administrative procedure, Judicial independence, China
Disciplines
Foreign Law | International Law
Publisher
American Association for the Comparative Study of Law
Publication Date
Winter 1991
Rights Information
Copyright 1991 by the American Association for the Comparative Study of Law, Inc.
Rights Holder
American Association for the Comparative Study of Law, Inc.
Permanent URL
http://hdl.handle.net/2047/d20002349
Recommended Citation
American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 95-119, Winter 1991.
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Notes
Originally published in the American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 95-119, Winter 1991.