Advisor(s)

Michael Carlton Tolley

Contributor(s)

William F.S. Miles, Peter VonDoepp

Date of Award

2008

Date Accepted

4-2008

Degree Grantor

Northeastern University

Degree Level

Ph.D.

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy

Department or Academic Unit

College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Political Science

Keywords

Political science, Malawi, Uganda, Tanzania, Judiciary, Democracy, Courts

Subject Categories

Judicial power--Malawi, Judicial power--Tanzania, Judicial power--Uganda, New-democracies--Africa (Sub-Saharan), Africa (Sub-Saharan)--Politics and government

Disciplines

Political Science

Abstract

It is broadly accepted that an independent and empowered judiciary is central to the rule of law. This dissertation examines the construction of judicial power in emerging democracies through addressing the paradoxical presence of strong judicial power in weak and volatile democracies. I argue that we must unpack our assumptions about democracy and move beyond regime based theories of judicial behavior. I find that existing strategic decision-making theories do not adequately account for the emergence of judicial power in sub-Saharan Africa. Instead this study finds that variation in level of judicial institutionalization or viability accounts for the presence of strong judicial power in weak democracies. A judiciary with a high level of institutional viability is able to withstand the frequent exogenous shocks typically present in sub-Saharan Africa's neopatrimonial regimes.

Document Type

Dissertation

Rights Information

Copyright 2008

Rights Holder

Rachel Ellett



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