Advisor(s)

David A. DeSteno

Contributor(s)

Stephen G. Harkins (1948-), Adam J. Reeves

Date of Award

2008

Date Accepted

6-2008

Degree Grantor

Northeastern University

Degree Level

Ph.D.

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy

Department or Academic Unit

College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Psychology

Keywords

Psychology, Social psychology, Morality, Emotion

Subject Categories

Ethics--Psychological aspects, Judgment (Ethics), Social ethics

Disciplines

Psychology

Abstract

Three studies explore the hypothesis that morality is defined by evolved social-cognitive abilities and social emotions tailored to the development of trusting and cooperative relationships with others. Study 1 will show a fundamental bias in moral judgment that functions to elevate one?s conception of one?s own moral reputation relative to others, and show that this bias extends to group-level social identities. Study 2 will address the cause of this bias, showing that the phenomenon does not result from self-serving automatic intuitions, but rather from the effect of self-serving motivated reasoning which operates in direct competition with more basic and automatic selfless intuitions. Study 3 will extend the social model beyond moral judgment to moral action, investigating the implications of group-membership on the experience of prosocial emotions as well as the frequency and degree of altruistic behavior. Taken together these studies suggest a need for a shift away from traditional arguments debating the relative importance of emotion and reason in moral judgment, and towards a consideration of the function of our moral capacities. Subjects were recruited from the Northeastern University introductory psychology participant pool.

Document Type

Dissertation

Rights Holder

Piercarlo Valdesolo


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