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THE CAMBRIDGE RING:

A Biographical Account of Five King's Men Who Spied for Stalin

The Cambridge Five were the KGB's crowning glory in their struggle against Fascism and Western Imperialism. The sheer degree to which these five men - Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, Anthony Blunt and John Cairncross – compromised the British Government makes the Cambridge Ring arguably one of the greatest, if not the greatest, penetration operations achieved to date. Yuri Modin remarked of the NKVD feat: "No other spy organization had accomplished such a devastating coup."[1] In a feat of brilliance, the Soviets had acquired young members of Britain's elite who were poised for careers perfect for long-term espionage. Yet these men were not coerced. They did not spy under duress. They were youthful products of the 1930s whose passionate and liberal ideals had been awakened by the intensifying Fascist movement in Europe.[2] Nor were they inspired by reward and they were quick to refuse any monetary gift from their clandestine employers.[3]

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[1] Yuri Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends,* trans. Anthony Roberts (London: Headline Book Publishing, 1994), 102.
[2] Anthony Purdy and Douglas Sutherland, *Burgess and Maclean* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), 36.
[3] Dusko Doder, "Of Moles and Men", *The Nation*, 18 February 2002, 7.

As an intelligence network, the Cambridge Five were an enigma. These men had begun as friends and, with the exception of Cairncross, had actively participated in the formation of their secret group.[4] The overwhelmingly prolific nature of their work was largely the result of their own motivation. They remained largely undirected by the NKVD who gladly accepted the thousands of "classified papers, reports, memoranda, minutes, intercepts and photographs" with accompanying annotations, which flowed into Moscow from London.[5] Regardless of their individual fates, each of these men began as a devoted young agent. They succeeded in making the British government and, to an extent the American government, virtually transparent to the Soviet Union at perhaps the most impactful period in global politics in the twentieth century: World War II and the start of the Cold War.

KIM PHILBY: The Man in MI6

Harold Adrian Russell "Kim" Philby was, if not the most famous of the Cambridge Five, unquestionably the first.[6] Recruited by the NKVD in 1934, he continued to work with Soviet intelligence even after the defections of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean in 1951. As asserted by Cambridge Five historian Nigel West, Philby "proved to be an assiduous spy for the NKVD."[7] Philby provided the NKVD and political advisors with incalculable insight into the inner workings of the British Secret Intelligence Service, commonly referred to as SIS or MI6.[8] As the result of his

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[4] Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, eds., *TRIPLEX: Secrets from the Cambridge Spies* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009), 104, 1.
[5] West, *TRIPLEX,* 3.
[6] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 46.
[7] West, *TRIPLEX*, 104.
[8] Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, *The Crown Jewels: The British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB Archives* (London: HarperCollins*Publishers,* 1998), 295.

commitment "there was nothing remotely secret about MI6 or its operations, which evidently remained handicapped for many years after these breaches of security."[9]

Kim Philby was born on January 1, 1912 to Harry St. John and Dora Philby in Punjab, British India.[10] His father, Harry St. John Philby, was a famous British diplomat and subject of intense interest to the NKVD; this was due in part to his association with the former British Ambassador to Russia, Robert Bruce Lockhart.[11] It was firmly believed among intelligence circles in Russia that Lockhart had been involved in the 1918 plot with British master spy, Sidney Reilly, to overthrow Lenin's fledgling Bolshevik government.[12] According to Nigel West, Philby's first assignment from his new controllers was to spy on his father. Apparently he made little objection.[13] It has been generally conceded that Philby had a less than ideal relationship with his estranged father, who later left Dora and Kim in England, converted to Islam, and took a Saudi slave girl as his second wife.[14]

Philby enrolled in Trinity College at Cambridge University to study History in 1929. In 1931 he changed his focus to Economics and subsequently met Maurice Dobb, "one of the first British intellectuals to become a card-carrying Communist."[15] He was invited to join a "top-secret society" at the university called the Apostles, where he soon befriended fellow members Anthony Blunt and Guy Burgess.[16] After Philby's graduation in 1933, Dobb referred him to some contacts in Paris who suggested he work as treasurer for the International Organization for Aid to Revolutionaries (IOAR) in Paris and

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[9] West, *The Crown Jewels*, pp
[10] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 46.
[11] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 345.
[12] ibid, x.
[13] ibid, x.
[14] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 46.
[15] ibid, 48.
[16] ibid, 49.

Vienna.[17] Philby's experiences in Austria - his witnessing firsthand the rise of Fascism, destitute depression and the massacres of Socialists by the government - cemented his loyalty to Communism.[18] In Austria Philby met his first wife, Litzi Friedman, an Austrian Jewish Communist. They moved to London in April 1933.[19] During the interrogation that followed Burgess and Maclean's defections in 1951, Philby was forced to defend this previous marriage to a Communist. Philby skillfully assured the British investigator that it was the only means by which to save her from Nazi persecution.[20]

There is a discrepancy between the different accounts of Philby's recruitment by the NKVD, as might be expected in the biography of a spy. One might presume that their paper trail would reflect the same sort of duplicity under which they lived. Yuri Modin, who processed all of the Cambridge Five's documents in Moscow from 1944 to 1947 and served as London rezident from 1947 to 1951, claimed that Litzi was the catalyst for Philby's recruitment by the NKVD.[21] Modin stated that Litzi was first to make contact with Edith Tudor-Hart, photographer and British Communist Party (CPGB) activist.[22] With Litzi's encouragement, Edith introduced Kim to the NKVD illegal operative, Arnold Deutsch (OTTO).[23] Genrik Borovik, author of *The Philby Files*, agreed that Edith Tudor-Hart was the link between Philby and Deutsch, but made no mention of Litzi's involvement.[24] According to Borovik, Tudor-Hart organized a secret meeting between Philby and Arnold Deutsch on a bench in London's Regent Park, during which Deutsch

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[17] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 49.
[18] ibid, 51.
[19] Genrikh Borovik, *The Philby Files: The Secret Life of Master Spy Kim Philby,* ed. Phillip Knightley (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1994), 22-23.
[20] ibid, 298.
[21] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 51.
[22] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 294; Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 52.
[23] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 53.
[24] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 31.

encouraged Philby to pursue a "bourgeois career" in journalism or the government. As an infiltrator he could best serve the anti-Fascist cause.[25] A letter from MAR (Ignatz Reiss) to NKVD Headquarters at Lubyanka dated June 22, 1934 confirmed the Regent Park meeting with OTTO, Philby's recruitment through Edith, and his new pseudonyms: SONNY and SÖNCHEN.[26]

Philby's first assignment was to distance himself from his former socialist and communist ties, which was not difficult since his father was a recognized supporter of Hitler.[27] Borovik revealed that, in September 1934, Philby provided his new controller with a list of seven men, seven possible recruits. Donald Maclean was first on the list, Guy Burgess was last.[28] Philby recruited Maclean just before Christmas 1934.[29] Burgess, whom he regarded as "an astonishing intellect," was too flamboyant a Communist Party member to recruit as a covert agent.[30] Therefore, according to Borovik's account from his interview with Philby in the 1980s, Burgess's recruitment was originally unintended. Burgess had noticed instantly when his friend, and former lover Donald Maclean, suddenly veered from socialism. After badgering Maclean, Burgess was reluctantly recruited in 1935.[31] Modin, however, offered an alternate account claiming that Burgess was the "real leader of the ring" and was immediately enlisted by Philby after his own recruitment in May, 1934.[32] Perhaps Philby's less flattering account of Burgess's enlistment was due to a long-standing resentment towards

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[25] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 29.
[26] ibid, 38-39.
[27] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 51.
[28] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 42.
[29] ibid, 46.
[30] ibid, 43.
[31] ibid, 48-49.
[32] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 53.

Burgess for ruining his intelligence career in 1951.[33] Both sources maintained that Philby refused to believe Burgess was tricked into his defection by the KGB. Philby bluntly refused even to visit his dying friend in 1963.[34]

In 1935 Philby began work for an Anglo-German magazine and traveled between London and Berlin frequently.[35] His first piece of concrete intelligence was a long list of Nazi sympathizers in Britain, notably those with positions in the government, politics and the aristocracy.[36] When civil war broke out in Spain in 1936, OTTO sent Philby to Spain as a freelance journalist.[37] He made few strides in the beginning and was quickly suspected by the Italians in Spain to be a spy for the British. This inspired some officers at the 'Centre' (NKVD Headquarters) to believe that he was actually a German spy. Fortunately for Philby, no one in Spain suspected him of being a Soviet spy. [38]

Further controversy arose over a plot to kill General Franco. Borovik asserted that this was a command from Moscow Centre and that Burgess was sent to meet Philby in Gibraltar to give him his new directive.[39] Modin, of course, claimed that it was Philby who suggested assassinating Franco. [40] This seems unlikely since Philby confessed later in life that he was certain he could never withstand imprisonment or torture.[41] Modin's argument is further contradicted by the fact that Franco survived four private meetings with Philby. As the result of a rather tragic incident, Kim Philby was granted the rare opportunity to interview General Franco. In the winter of 1937, Philby and three other

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[33] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 256.
[34] ibid, 256.
[35] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 57-58.
[36] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 54-55.
[37] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 61.
[38] ibid, 69-70.
[39] ibid, 92-93.
[40] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 56.
[41] Borovik, *The Philby Files,* 189-190.

foreign correspondents had driven to the battle zone at Teruel at the behest of the General.[42] On December 31, 1937 their car was hit by a Republican shell and Philby was the only survivor.[43] Much to Philby's surprise, General Franco personally awarded him the Order of the Red Cross "for military valour" and for his "heroic actions on the front in the struggle against Communism."[44] Philby was subsequently invited to interview Franco on four different occasions.[45] If the plot to kill Franco did originate from Moscow Centre, it was not the first careless instruction to occur during their relationship with Philby. He later discovered that the address for the mysterious Madame Dupont, to whom he had sent all of his secret correspondence from Spain, was none other than the address for the USSR's Embassy in France.[46]

The period leading up to the war was a difficult time for each member of the Cambridge Ring. The purges in the Soviet Union disrupted their work for the NKVD greatly.[47] The death of Deutsch, followed by the executions of Theodor Mally and Ignatz Reiss, made it very difficult to sustain connection with Moscow.[48] In 1938, Lubyanka was in such chaos that they appealed to the Paris rezident for a complete report on the mysterious SÖNCHEN – they had no idea who Philby was![49] The new London rezident Anatoly Gorsky was recalled to Moscow in 1940, at which point contact between Philby and Moscow Centre ended.[50]

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[42] Borovik, *The Philby Files* 97.
[43] ibid, 97-100.
[44] Borovik, *The Philby Files,* 103; ibid, 101.
[45] ibid, 103.
[46] ibid, 126.
[47] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 134.
[48] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, x.
[49] ibid, 126.
[50] ibid, 149.

In May 1940 Philby was working for *The Times* in France. He was fortunate to escape back to London in June after the German invasion.[51] According to Philby, he met a woman by the name of Esther Marsdon-Smedley on the train from Plymouth to London. She had been working in Belgium as a correspondent for the Daily Express; and she was also an agent for Section D of SIS.[52] Philby has always credited Ms. Marsdon-Smedley for his recruitment into SIS.[53] Years later while interrogating Philby, Dick White insisted that Guy Burgess had recruited him. However, Kim maintained until his death in 1988 that this was not the case.[54]

Philby was first assigned to the Special Operations Executive (SOE). He wrote a proposal for a training center, which became SO-2 Station 17. There he instructed SIS agents in sabotage.[55] By virtue of his own insistence Philby finally regained contact with Moscow.[56] In September 1941, Philby was recruited by Section V - SIS counter-espionage - largely at the recommendation of his father's friend and Section V chief, Colonel Valentine Vivian.[57] At SIS Philby began an affair with his future second wife, Aileen Furse, an MI5 employee in the archive department. Philby took advantage of her access to the archives and sent countless files to Lubyanka on British agents employed around the world.[58] Although the files did not include the names of the operatives, they did contain country code numbers, agent codenames and numbers and fairly revealing biographical data.[59] These files were enhanced by the extensive lists of SIS symbols and

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[51] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 150.
[52] Borovik, *The Philby Files,* 157; ibid, 163.
[53] ibid*,* 160.
[54] ibid, 160.
[55] ibid, 165-167.
[56] ibid, 151-153.
[57] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 60; West, *The Crown Jewels*, 297.
[58] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 61.
[59] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 61.

internal country codes that Philby supplied to Moscow, and which were recently published in Nigel West's *TRIPLEX*.[60] Without these codes it would have taken much longer to decipher, for instance, that any five-digit number beginning with 95 pertained to the USSR or that WP stood for the United States' Department of State.[61]

Philby believed that his best piece of intelligence was a set of telegrams from the German Ambassador to Japan. The Ambassador's correspondence from November 1941 clearly indicated that the Japanese did not intend to invade the USSR and were directing military operations southwards.[62] This allowed Stalin to move valuable reserves from Siberia to the Eastern Front.[63] Philby's intelligence had been confirmed by an identical report sent to Moscow from their agent in Japan, Richard Sorge.[64] Philby attributed the success of this intelligence to two factors: first, that he and Sorge had no knowledge of each other's existence and second, that this was precisely the information Stalin desired at the time and was therefore inclined to believe it.[65] The power of Stalin's disbelief over concrete intelligence was best demonstrated by the USSR's unpreparedness in the German invasion on June 22, 1941. Stalin had received no less than eighty-four separate warnings of the forthcoming attack (Operation Barbarossa) and had dismissed them as conspiracy.[66]

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[60] West, *TRIPLEX*, 131-133.
[61] ibid, 132-133.
[62] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 186.
[63] ibid, 187.
[64] ibid, 187.
[65] ibid, 186-187.
[66] Jeffrey Burds, "The Soviet War against 'Fifth Columnists': The Case of Chechnya 1942-4", *Journal of Contemporary History,* Volume 42 (2007), 288.

It has been argued by Anthony Glees that "Philby's major wartime achievement was to undermine efforts to create an exile resistance force…inside Germany."[67] There is evidence of this in P.R.J. Winter's article about the July 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler. An intelligence report was produced in 1942 detailing a split between the Abwehr, Admiral Canaris in particular, and the Nazi Party. Philby personally vetoed the circulation of this document throughout Whitehall dismissing it as "mere speculation."[68] Despite the report's accuracy, it would not have been in Stalin's best interests to have Britain conspiring secretly with German resistance without Soviet involvement.[69]

Philby quickly became Deputy Director of SIS Section V (counter-espionage).[70] With this appointment he gained access to various sources of intelligence and accordingly reported on the five classes of British special material to the Soviets.[71] One of these sources was TRIPLEX. At the beginning of the war Section V was the first to access TRIPLEX (XXX) material – correspondence copied from neutral diplomatic bags – but Anthony Blunt was swiftly able to convince SIS to share the operation with MI5.[72] In his autobiography, Philby went into great detail about the method of covert extraction, photography and replacement of documents in these bags. British intelligence services would orchestrate major flight delays, then offer nearby hotel rooms to the couriers with the option to leave their diplomatic bags with British security services for safe keeping.

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[67] John Lewis Gaddis, "Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War Origins," *Diplomatic History* 13 (Spring 1989), 204.
[68] P.R.J. Winter, "British Intelligence and the July Bomb Plot of 1944: A Reappraisal." *War in History* 13, no. 4 (November 2006), 474-475.
[69] Winter, "British Intelligence," 475.
[70] Winter, "British Intelligence," 474; Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 60.
[71] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 300.
[72] ibid, 139-140.

Conveniently, "the Russians were exempt from this treatment…they always sent two couriers….[and] the bags were thought to contain bombs."[73]

Nigel West's recent release, *TRIPLEX*, confirms the wealth of materials Kim Philby supplied to the NKVD. West's collection alone introduces a new set of twenty-five documents from Philby including reports entitled: *Breaking Soviet Ciphers; Section IX Personnel; Memo on Penetrating Russia and Colonel Vivian's Reply; SIS Plans for Anti-Soviet Operations June 1944; The Structure of SIS;* and reports on SIS networks in the Mediterranean.[74] Colonel Vivian's Briefing from 1943 was Philby's own report about a Section V meeting held by Vivian on the subject of "Communist penetration of British secret organizations."[75] Vivian had apparently found "it curious that Russia should be spying on one of its allies" and informed Philby that "he would not take part in any intensified campaign against the Communists."[76] The Colonel did note, however, that it was clear the Soviets were interested in recruiting from university Communist clubs and so SIS candidates should be monitored.[77] He also declared that the "diplomatic bags of the 'gallant allies' of Great Britain had no immunity at all as far as the British were concerned!"[78]

As the war drew to a close, Philby sent to Moscow another document on anti-Soviet measures: *Memo on Penetrating Russia*. He included Colonel Vivian's reply.[79] The memo discussed proposed methods in detail for infiltrating the Soviet Union to gain intelligence. This included various methods of 'official cover' and 'natural cover.' One

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[73] Terry Crowdy, *Deceiving Hitler: Double Cross and Deception in World War II* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 111.
[74] West, *TRIPLEX*, 104-188.
[75] ibid, 104.
[76] West, *TRIPLEX*, 105; ibid, 107.
[77] ibid, 106.
[78] ibid, 107.
[79] ibid, 120-131.

plan suggested trade and finance as a primary route for obtaining information.[80] An official cover referred to "government finance and economic missions, commercial attachés and junior commercial representatives in consulates." Natural covers included "businessmen, industrialists, specialists, engineers, chemists, etc., or trained intelligence personnel accompanying them on their visits to the USSR."[81] SIS officer Robert Smith then commented that natural covers were the best option for use in Russia because the official cover "remains too obvious and too unreliable."[82] They even distributed a list of potentially targeted industries and firms, such as Malcolm and Company (the Flax Industry), the Timber Industry, the Fur Trade, Price Forbes Reinsurance Ltd., and the Russian Ballet.[83] Colonel Vivian brusquely replied that: "the Russians will be expecting us to behave as they do…trying to work on the inside will get us nowhere…we need to set up our organizations on the Russian perimeter."[84] Philby provided critical insight into plans for post-war anti-Soviet operations and into the opinions of the personnel involved. The beauty of Philby's work was that, in addition to countless raw documents, he also provided pages upon pages of his own annotations.[85]

TRIPLEX also confirmed that ISOS intelligence (intercepted German hand ciphers) from Philby contained details of MAX traffic. [86] Operation Monastery was a Soviet maneuver that fed disinformation to the Germans via three networks: "Max North," "Max South", and "Klatt/Kauder."[87] While the British were intercepting German

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[80] West, *TRIPLEX*, 122.
[81] ibid, 122.
[82] ibid, 123.
[83] ibid, 128.
[84] ibid, 130.
[85] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 295.
[86] West, *TRIPLEX*, 108.
[87] Robert W. Stephan, *Stalin's Secret War: Soviet Counterintelligence Against the Nazis, 1941-1945*, (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 153-155.

traffic, Philby, Blunt and Cairncross were able to confirm for the Soviets that their disinformation tactics were effective and that the Germans perceived this to be legitimate intelligence.[88] For instance, Soviet weapon production in 1942 exceeded the German War Economy Branch's estimation by over three hundred percent.[89] The Soviets had successfully deceived the Germans by leading them to underestimate Soviet production capabilities, which played a decisive role in the Soviet victory at Stalingrad.[90]

The proficiency of the Cambridge Ring soon turned against their favor. Even as the Germans were marching on Moscow, Stalin was convinced that British intelligence was conspiring against the USSR.[91] In fact, Philby was ordered to locate files on anti-Soviet operations dating back to 1935.[92] Philby could only confirm the opposite: "that Communism had not been a current SIS target since 1939."[93] His "minus information" led to serious suspicion.[94] In 1942 NKVD analyst in Moscow, Elena Modrzhinskaya, referred to by Borovik as the "Russian version of James [Jesus] Angleton", submitted a report claiming that the extraordinarily productive nature of Philby, Burgess and Blunt could only mean that they were double agents for the British.[95] It seemed unfathomable that they could obtain as many documents as they did right from under the watchful eyes of the British Security Services.[96] Her argument was abetted when Philby supplied a copy of the October 4th, 1943 telegram "by the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin to the

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[88] Stephan, *Stalin's Secret War*, 162.
[89] Bernd Wegner, "The Tottering Giant: German Perceptions of Soviet Military and Economic Strength in Preparation for 'Operation Blau' (1942)," in Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes, eds. *Intelligence and International Relations, 1900-1945* (Exeter Studies in History No. 15) (University of Exeter, 1987), 303.
[90] Stephan, *Stalin's Secret War*, 160-161.
[91] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 197.
[92] ibid, 202.
[93] West, *TRIPLEX*, 143.
[94] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 193.
[95] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, xiv; West, *The Crown Jewels*, 166.
[96] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 197.

Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo about his conversation with Hitler and Ribbentrop."[97] The final paragraph was missing from Philby's version. Another source had provided a complete copy and the final paragraph contained sensitive intelligence alluding to the potential for a peace treaty between Hitler and the USSR. Although Philby had included a note that the last paragraph was indecipherable by SIS cryptographers, the NKVD was compelled to believe that Philby was a British plant.[98] In June 1944, however, Philby was able to provide a document that helped to assuage the Centre's doubts. It was entitled *Co-operation with the Russians* and contained a statement from the Deputy Chief of SIS declaring: "we can't trust the Russians."[99] This was just one of the compromising political sentiments enclosed. The politically damaging statements within the document compelled Moscow to re assess their suspicions about Philby's loyalty.[100]

Philby's formal rehabilitation by the NKVD in October 1944, however, was principally due to his appointment as chief of the new SIS Section IX. The NKVD even rechristened him, STANLEY.[101] Section IX was the new anti-Soviet Section dedicated solely to anti-Communist (XK) intelligence and espionage.[102] In the words of his last London controller, Yuri Modin: "this made Philby the most important operative we had anywhere in the world."[103] Due to Philby's various positions in the SIS during the war, the NKVD had been able to compile a comprehensive list of almost every British agent

[97] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 214.
[98] ibid, 214-216.
[99] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 167.
[100] ibid, 166.
[101] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 233-236.
[102] West, *TRIPLEX*, 363; ibid, 2.
[103] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 46.

operating around the world, including those inside the USSR.[104] Quite astonishingly, Philby had succeeded in impressing both of his employers. In 1945 he was awarded two honors: first, the Order of the Red Banner for "his conscientious work for over ten years," followed by the Order of the British Empire. "He was the only person in SIS who joined during the war to receive this high honor."[105] This award was not based purely on peer admiration: "Menzies once told someone that he would be happy to vacate his chair as director of SIS for someone like Philby."[106]

Philby continued to pass valuable information about XK developments. Another memo from Colonel Vivan in September 1944 argued that first priorities for XK operations were "the Balkans, Italy, France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland."[107] A comment in a document dated September 6, 1944 entitled *The XK Problem in SIS* further helped to redeem Philby's reputation in Moscow. The report stated "it must be borne in mind that Communism has not been a current SIS target since 1939."[108] This reiterated a point in the *Report on the Western Mediterranean Inspection* provided by Philby in August 1944 in which the author, an SIS agent, informed London headquarters that "officers have the impression that XK 'can wait'…[there exists a] lack of knowledge by our junior officers of the historical underpinnings of XK and its ideology."[109]

In September 1945 Philby had a narrow escape from catastrophe. The Soviet Vice-Consul in Istanbul and high-ranking NKVD agent, Konstantin Volkov, attempted to

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[104] Stephan, *Stalin's Secret War*, 112.
[105] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 249.
[106] ibid, 250.
[107] West, *TRIPLEX*, 140.
[108] ibid, 143.
[109] ibid, 162.

defect to the British Embassy in Istanbul.[110] In return for asylum and a reasonable sum, Volkov was prepared to offer a complete record of Soviet agents in Turkey and the names of three Soviet agents in the British government. Modin ascertained that the three names were Philby, Burgess and Maclean.[111] Fortunately for Philby, the laborious bureaucracy of the British Diplomatic and Secret Services delayed the process. A letter about Volkov's offer was sent to London and, naturally, a copy was sent to Philby as head of the anti-Soviet section. Philby immediately alerted his Soviet controller and then convinced SIS chief Stewart Menzies to send him to Turkey to meet with Volkov personally. By the time he arrived, Volkov had conveniently been recalled to Moscow.[112]

That same month Igor Gouzenko, a GRU code clerk, defected in Ottowa, Canada.[113] Gouzenko brought with him hundreds of documents jeopardizing Soviet networks in North America.[114] His information also prompted the investigation of the British physicist, Allan Nunn May.[115] Philby notified his London controllers of Gouzenko's defection on November 20, 1945 and was able to provide Moscow with Gouzenko's debriefings.[116] Philby further proved his worth by monitoring defector Elizabeth Bentley's interviews and, on December 4, 1945, provided a list of "forty-one Soviet agents and their American sources" she had passed onto the FBI. Allen Weinstein appropriately referred to Philby as "a one-man damage control unit."[117]

In February 1947 Philby was sent to Turkey where he remained for two years, and for those two years he sent SIS agents to their certain deaths on anti-Soviet operations in

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[110] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 177.
[111] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 124.
[112] ibid, 123-125.
[113] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 238; Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors*, 24.
[114] Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors*, 24.
[115] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 238.
[116] Weinstein, *The Haunted Wood*, 104; West, *The Crown Jewels*, 238.
[117] Weinstein, *The Haunted Wood*, 108.

Armenia and Georgia.[118] In August 1949 he was sent to Washington D.C. as chief of the SIS bureau. As the liaison between the CIA and SIS, Philby was able to warn Moscow of the December 1949 Operation (FIEND) to overthrow Communist dictator Enver Hoxha in Albania. He also thwarted an additional two attempts.[119] In March 1951 he alerted Moscow to another joint CIA-SIS operation, this time parachuting Ukrainian émigrés into Ukraine.[120] Gaddis attributed the deaths of several hundred [agents] to Philby.[121] Yuri Totrov (Chief of First Directorate of the KGB) argued that the failure of Operation FIEND was due to the fact that "from its beginning [it] was under control of the Albanian Security Service," but that the Americans saw fit to place the entirety of the blame on Philby after he was implicated in the defections of Burgess and Maclean in 1951. [122]

In Washington, Philby served as the British liaison officer for a coordinated effort with the FBI to identify Soviet spies revealed in the VENONA decrypts.[123] The U.S. Army's Signals Intelligence Service had created the VENONA program in February 1943 in an effort to decipher Soviet traffic from during the war.[124] Philby had already notified Moscow that the Government Code and Cipher School at Bletchley Park in Britain had been working to break Soviet ciphers earlier in the war.[125] At his new post, Philby quickly befriended a young American cryptanalyst by the name of Meredith Gardner, one of the principle analysts working on VENONA.[126] In1948 it was discovered that a cipher

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[118] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 251-252.
[119] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 186.
[120] ibid, 189.
[121] Gaddis, "Intelligence, Espionage", 99.
[122] Yuri Totrov, "Western Intelligence Operations in Eastern Europe", 1945-1954, *The Journal of Intelligence History* 5, no.1 (Summer 2005), 71-79.
[123] David C. Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors: Intrigue, Deception, and the Secrets that Destroyed Two of the Cold War's Most Important Agents* (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2003), 43-44.
[124] Weinstein, *The Haunted Wood,* 291.
[125] West, *TRIPLEX*, 111.
[126] Weinstein, *The Haunted Wood,* 291; Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 195.

clerk at the Soviet Embassy had made a dreadful error on two 1945 telegrams, which led to the search for a Soviet mole who had worked at the British Embassy in Washington during the war.[127] In 1949 Gardner told Philby that they had discovered the codename of the mole: HOMER.[128] By April 1951, the list of suspects had been whittled down to one, Donald Maclean. Promptly notified by Philby, Maclean defected in May 1951.[129] However, not all went according to plan. Maclean's escort Guy Burgess was not supposed to defect, and his doing so spelled disaster for Philby's career.[130] Burgess had been living with Philby in Washington for a year prior to his defection.[131] Despite supporting evidence, Philby refused to accept the possibility that Burgess was coerced into defecting by the NKVD.[132]

The interrogation began soon after the double defection and continued until January 1952.[133] Philby was forced to resign.[134] In 1956, having apparently been absolved of suspicion, Philby was approached to work as an undercover agent for SIS in Beirut, Lebanon.[135] He arrived undercover as a correspondent for *The Observer* and *The Economist*.[136] In Beirut he reestablished his relationship with his father and met his future third wife, Eleanor Brewer, who was married to a *New York Times* journalist at the time.[137] He also succeeded in a very dangerous reactivation attempt by inviting an

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[127] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 192.
[128] ibid, 195.
[129] Sheila Kerr, "Investigating Soviet Espionage and Subversion: The Case of Donald Maclean," *Intelligence and National Security* 17, no. 1 (Spring 2002), 103.
[130] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 284.
[131] ibid, 275.
[132] ibid, 283.
[133] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 296; ibid, 303.
[134] ibid,296.
[135] ibid, 321.
[136] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 234.
[137] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 325-328.

undercover KGB rezident, "Mr. Petukhov," to his apartment in Beirut.[138] He provided intelligence of minimal importance for the remaining years until January 1963 when SIS agent and old friend, Nicholas Elliott, appeared in Beirut claiming to have new proof that Philby had spied for the USSR until 1949.[139] On January 23, 1963 Kim Philby boarded the *Dolmatova* to Odessa and defected to the USSR.[140]

Although Eleanor eventually joined him in Moscow, their marriage quickly deteriorated. Already hurt by his abrupt departure, she was even more devastated when he confessed that the Communist Party would always come first.[141] His unwavering effort for the KGB had consistently been his "main work" in life.[142] In 1966 he embarked on a short-lived affair with Donald Maclean's wife Melinda, but his drinking discouraged her, which had steadily worsened after the death of his mother in 1957. [143] Philby met his fourth wife, Rufina Ivanova, through former British Soviet agent, George Blake.[144] She was a godsend for Kim, enforcing strict rules when it came to whiskey and cigarettes, to which he lovingly obliged.[145] He died May 11, 1988 and was the only one of the Cambridge Five to be buried in Russia.[146]

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[138] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 331-333.
[139] ibid, 3.
[140] ibid, 349-350.
[141] ibid, 363.
[142] ibid, 336.
[143] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 260; ibid, 236.
[144] Borovik, *The Philby* Files, 369; Rufina Filbi, Mikhail Lyubimov and Hayden B. Peake. *The Private Life of Kim Philby: The Moscow Years* (New York: Fromm International, 2000).
[145] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 35.
[146] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 267-268.

DONALD MACLEAN – The Man in the Foreign Office

Donald Duart Maclean was born in 1913 to the former Minister of Education, Sir Donald Maclean.[147] He attended Gresham's School in Norfolk and entered Trinity College at Cambridge University in 1931 to study Modern Languages and Literature.[148] According to Yuri Modin, Donald junior "grew up a sensitive, uncommunicative, somewhat withdrawn child" and had difficulty forming bonds with classmates.[149] Donald's father passed away during his freshman year.[150]

While at Trinity, Maclean met the mesmerizing Guy Burgess. In his fairly sensational book, published immediately prior to Kim Philby's defection in 1963, Anthony Purdy called Donald Maclean a "Burgess 'convert'," seduced by his eloquence and his passion for Marxism.[151] It was also assumed that Burgess seduced Maclean physically in addition to intellectually, and speculations have often been made about Maclean's ambiguous sexuality.[152] Regardless, Maclean was "convinced of the righteousness of socialism" and joined an underground cell of the Communist Party at Trinity.[153] Given his conservative background and ambitions for the Foreign Service, Maclean could not afford to be as overt in his leftist leanings as Burgess.[154] As it turned out, even after his defection to the USSR in 1951, Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan denied that Maclean should have been rejected from the Foreign Service on the basis of

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[147] Anthony Purdy and Douglas Sutherland, *Burgess and Maclean* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), 13.
[148] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 95.
[149] ibid, 95.
[150] ibid, 96.
[151] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 83.
[152] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 96.
[153] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 42; Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 96.
[154] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 42.

leftist flirtations during university. Maclean had appeared at the time of his employment to be a very capable candidate.[155]

There are two different accounts of Maclean's recruitment into the Cambridge Five. Based on his interview with Kim Philby in the mid-1980s, Genrik Borovik affirmed that one of Philby's first assignments from the NKVD was to produce a list of potential recruits. This list comprised of seven names, the first being the most highly recommended and the seventh being the least. Donald Maclean was first on the list.[156] Philby declared that "Maclean was suitable in every way: a convinced Communist, smart, serious and talented with a brilliant Foreign Office future."[157] So, on Donald's trip to London right before Christmas in 1934, Kim approached him with a proposal to work for the Communists.[158] Maclean seemed utterly un-phased by the proposition and was formally recruited in December 1934. For whom exactly they worked remained a mystery; Maclean and Philby were still unsure whether they were agents for the Comintern, the GRU or the NKVD.[159]

Modin, who claimed to have read each of the five men's files thoroughly, wrote that he was unable to find any reference to Maclean's recruitment.[160] He discussed three possibilities: first, that Maclean was approached by James Klugmann, his classmate at Greshman and Trinity and a member of the British Communist Party; second, that Burgess recruited him; and third, that Philby recruited him.[161] Curiously, Modin did not refer to any list from Philby.

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[155] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 30-33.
[156] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 41-42.
[157] ibid, 42.
[158] ibid, 46.
[159] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 47.
[160] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends,* 45; ibid, 96.
[161] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 46; Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 96.

Donald Maclean was accepted into the Foreign Office in October 1935. His NKVD controller at the time was Arnold Deutsch.[162] He began as secretary to the Western section of the Foreign Office and the department's responsibilities included Spain, Portugal and Switzerland and the Low Countries.[163] Maclean's first task from his controller was to "keep an eye on pro-Fascist individuals within the British governing classes."[164] In 1938 he was transferred to the British Embassy in Paris as a secretary and was promoted in 1940 to Third Secretary.[165] Maclean fell in love with the city of Paris so much so that he demanded Burgess accompany him on his defection because he was afraid that he simply would not be able to leave Paris on his way to Moscow.[166]

Although rather dramatic, Maclean did have a certain attachment to the city. During those first few years in Paris his penchant for binge drinking really developed, as well as his alleged "lapses of homosexuality."[167] In Paris, Maclean met a young American woman by the name of Melinda Marling and "fell head over heels" in love.[168] They were married in France in 1940 and escaped to London on June 23 that same year.[169] As a testament to the support she would provide Maclean throughout their marriage, Maclean felt compelled to confess his work for the NKVD prior to their wedding. She accepted his covert profession wholeheartedly.[170]

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[162] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 127.
[163] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 97.
[164] ibid, 97.
[165] ibid, 98.
[166] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 283.
[167] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 86.
[168] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 98.
[169] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 87.
[170] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 98-99.

Maclean was remarkably prolific during the war. Nigel West has determined that he sent a minimum of 4,593 documents to Moscow between 1941 and 1945.[171] In 1941, Maclean gained access to documents from the War Cabinet's military bureau.[172] He provided intelligence on relations between the Foreign Office, exile governments in London and contacts abroad. He was instructed to focus on issues concerning the USSR, but he also chose to provide documents pertaining to the strained relationship between France and Britain and discussions about the post-war fates of French territories.[173] The Cambridge Five were truly an exception in the fact that they were essentially self-directed.[174] Maclean maintained such a strong relationship with his NKVD controller Gorsky that he was allowed to act as intermediary for Philby on two occasions. The first instance happened when Philby was desperately trying to reconnect with the Centre in 1940, and the second was in late 1941 when Philby was introduced to his fifth controller.[175]

In March 1944, Maclean was promoted to First Secretary to the British Embassy in Washington D.C. He was renamed HOMER and Gorsky was sent to the U.S. in October 1944 to act as Maclean's private handler.[176] Maclean played a crucial role in the early days of Cold War politics. He passed correspondence between Lord Halifax (British Ambassador to the United States) and Churchill regarding American foreign and domestic policy.[177] In 1946, when Stalin needed to know the extent to which the Truman administration would commit to its new policy of containment, Maclean was able to

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[171] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 171.
[172] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 99.
[173] ibid, 100-101.
[174] West, *TRIPLEX*, 3.
[175] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 173-175.
[176] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 101; Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 89.
[177] Weinstein, *The Haunted Wood*, 230.

confirm that Truman would "never abandon Turkey," leading Stalin to back away from potential conflict.[178]

Maclean's principal accomplishment during his tenure in Washington - and perhaps during his tenure as a Soviet operative - was his appointment as the British Secretary to the Anglo-American committee on atomic development in the summer of 1945. The committee was responsible for coordinating the British Tube Alloys Project with the legendary Manhattan Project.[179] This position gave Maclean access to highly classified political and scientific documents.[180] Moreover, Maclean rubbed shoulders with U.S. diplomats, scientists and officials who held secrets to the world's most deadly weapon at a time when the Soviets were working frantically to possess their own.

Maclean had his finger on the pulse of the atomic energy community in Washington for over three years. Even when the Americans distanced their nuclear research from the British and established the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (U.S.A.E.C.) in 1946, Maclean was still the officer responsible for nuclear matters in the British Embassy and acquired access to offices of the U.S.A.E.C..[181] Maclean was not only permitted entrance to the offices, he was also granted a valuable "non-escort" pass.[182] As a result, Maclean was aware of the politics involved in creating the United Nations' Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC), disputes over UK and U.S. policy towards the Soviets and even rifts between the U.S. Congress and U.S. Department of

[178] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 120-121.
[179] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 91.
[180] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 89.
[181] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 119.
[182] Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors*, 49.

State over atomic energy policy. As Secretary of State Dean Acheson was said to have exclaimed following Maclean's defection: "My God, he knows everything!"[183]

Maclean's entre into the realm of atomic energy began with his appointment to the British Tube Alloys Program followed by the Combined Policy Committee (CPC); Maclean was the British Secretary for the CPC until his departure from Washington in August 1948.[184] In 1943, British Prime Minister Churchill and American President Roosevelt agreed to transfer British atomic energy scientists to the United States in order to concentrate efforts between the Manhattan Project and the British Tube Alloys program.[185] The CPC was created to coordinate atomic development as spelled out in the Quebec Agreement, which was signed by Roosevelt and Churchill on August 19, 1943.[186] The CPC, as explicitly stated in a top secret U.S. Department of State (DOS) memorandum, was an exceptional organization dealing with subjects of top secret nature and operating under "war-time agreements not yet notified to Congress".[187]

As an extension of the Quebec Agreement, Roosevelt and Churchill signed the "Agreement and Declaration of Trust" on June 13, 1944, which authorized formation of the Combined Development Trust (CDT) – renamed the Combined Development Agency (CDA) in 1948 – and which became a subsidiary body to the CPC.[188] According to a top

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[183] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 91.
[184] Confidential Memorandum, "Subject: Donald Maclean," dated 2 December 1955. "Country File: UK c. Burgess & Maclean, 1951-1956," Folder 21.89, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 525.
[185] Memorandum, "List of Public References to American, British and Canadian Cooperation in the Field of Atomic Energy," date unknown. "i. Publicity, 1948-1950," Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 55.
[186] Top secret memorandum from E. A. Gullion to Mr. Secretary, "Combined Policy Committee Meeting," dated 1 February 1947. "CPC General, 1946-1951," Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 55.
[187] ibid.
[188] Top secret memorandum from A. A. Wells to E. A. Gullion, dated 10 March 1948. "CDA General, 1946-1952," Folder 4.7, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 54.

secret DOS memorandum from 1953, the CDT was created "for the purpose of acquiring, on behalf of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, control of as much of the world's sources of atomic raw materials as possible…[and] raw materials acquired by the [CDT] were to be held for allocation by the Combined Policy Committee on the basis of agreed requirements."[189]

As atomic energy development was transferred from military to civilian control, Maclean's position became even more valuable. In a letter dated September 24, 1945, President Truman notified Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes that Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, intended to resign as Chairman of the CPC. Truman subsequently recommended that Byrnes take his place.[190] This signified a shift in power over atomic energy from the Department of War to the Department of State. With the transfer of the CPC Chair position from War to State, it logically followed that CPC records be transferred from safekeeping at the War Department to safekeeping at State. This was confirmed in the CPC meeting of February 3, 1947.[191]

As influence over atomic energy policy in Washington passed to the hands of those State Department officials handling the issue, the influence of their British counterparts increased. To estimate Maclean's degree of influence, it was useful to review the records of his American counterpart, Edmund Gullion, and American Secretary to the CPC. Secretary of State and CPC Chair, James F. Byrnes, recommended

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[189] Top secret memorandum, "Memorandum on Allocations," dated 6 August 1953. "History of US-UK-Canada Atomic Relations, 1939-1953," Folder 4.11.1, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 116.

[190] Letter from Harry S. Truman to James F. Byrnes, dated 24 September 1945. "CPC f. Membership CPC, ASCPC + CDT, 1945-1950." Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 55.

[191] Top secret agenda, "Combined Policy Committee Meeting," dated 3 February 1947. "CPC d. Meetings + Agendas, 1945-1951," Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 55.

Gullion for the position when he was the Special Assistant to Under Secretary of State, Robert A. Lovett.[192] This was a significantly high level of recommendation. Gullion, with whom Maclean enjoyed the majority of his correspondence according to State Department records, had a great deal of influence on atomic energy policy. In a letter from George F. Kennan to Under Secretary of State Lovett dated October 23, 1947, Kennan discussed his and Gullion's collaboration on a proposal to reinvigorate relations with the UK and Canada through the CPC, with the objective of obtaining more uranium.[193] Lovett followed Kennan and Gullion's proposal with a memo to Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, urging him to initiate negotiations through the CPC in order to rectify the United States' depleting stock of uranium.[194]

Gullion also had the authority to personally discourage Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, from granting CPC membership to the Chairman of the U.S.A.E.C. for fear that the CPC's activities would consequently be hindered by restrictions enforced by the McMahon act.[195] The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 – or the "McMahon Act" – gave control of U.S. involvement in the CDT to the newly formed U.S.A.E.C., and restricted the exchange of information between the U.S., the UK and Canada.[196] Given the level of impact that Gullion had on atomic energy policy in Washington, it seems reasonable to

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[192] Top secret letter from James F. Byrnes to Leslie R. Groves, dated 2 January 1947. "CPC f. Membership CPC, ASCPC + CDT, 1945-1950." Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 55.

[193] Letter from George F. Kennan to Robert A. Lovett, dated 23 October 1947. "Interchange of Information, 1945-1947," Folder 4.11.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 57.

[194] Top secret memorandum for the Secretary from Robert A. Lovett, dated 3 November 1947. "Interchange of Information, 1945-1947," Folder 4.11.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 57.

[195] Secret letter from Edmund A. Gullion to Dean Acheson, dated 16 May 1947. "CPC f. Membership CPC, ASCPC + CDT, 1945-1950." Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 55.

[196] Top secret memorandum from E. A. Gullion to Mr. Secretary, "Combined Policy Committee Meeting," dated 1 February 1947.

suggest that Maclean also had a considerable impact on British atomic energy policy. Maclean's contact with influential figures such as Gullion, not to mention his role in the CPC, must have amplified his support in Moscow. The fact that President Truman was willing to maintain – and reinvigorate - the CPC despite its direct violation of Congressional legislation, emphasizes the significance of Maclean's position.[197]

An examination of State Department documents pertaining to the CPC show regular correspondence between Gullion and Maclean and reinforce the assessment that Maclean's position afforded him access to valuable atomic energy information. The exchanges between Gullion and Maclean suggest a certain level of familiarity, citing colloquialisms such as "Dear Ed" and "Yours ever".[198] There was even a memorandum of conversation dated August 7, 1947, which referenced a dinner held at the Macleans' residence. The Macleans' had hosted Gullion and Mr. Dennis Ricket, Special Advisor to the UK Representative at the UN, to discuss U.S.-British Atomic Energy Policies. The discussion included U.S.-British cooperation in light of restrictions enforced by the McMahon Act. It also might be important to note that a copy of Gullion's record of the evening was given to George F. Kennan.[199] According to Gullion's account, Maclean revealed "the British had already had an opinion from the Americans, through the Combined Staff or Joint Staff, disapproving construction of a large scale atom pile in

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[197] Memorandum for the President from George C. Marshall, dated 6 September 1947. "CPC f. Membership CPC, ASCPC + CDT, 1945-1950." Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 55.

[198] Letter from Donald D. Maclean to Edmund A. Gullion, dated 7 November 1947. "United Kingdom General, 1946-1952," Folder 21.89, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 53; Top secret letter from Donald D. Maclean to Edmund A. Gullion, dated 19 February 1947. "Interchange of Information, 1945-1947," Folder 4.11.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 57.

[199] Top secret memorandum of conversation, "Subject: US-British Atomic Energy Policies," dated 7 August 1947. "Interchange of Information, 1945-1947," Folder 4.11.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 57.

Britain on military grounds." Gullion, caught off guard, wrote: "I had not previously known that the British were aware of American military opinion on this subject."[200]

Other correspondence between the two colleagues includes a thank you note from Gullion to Maclean for lending his office a copy of "Notes on the Organisation of Atomic Energy Work in the United Kingdom," and another for lending the *Foreign Office Guide* in February 1948.[201] One could assume that there was a similar exchange of American documents between the two men. Also, it appears that Maclean was as involved as his U.S. counterpart in bilateral discussions. This is gleaned from Maclean's confirmation to Gullion, that he was privy to records of top secret conversations between Minister Counselor, Roger Makins, at the British Embassy in Washington, and Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson.[202] A handwritten note in the State Department files at the National Archives even referred to a May 1948 letter from Maclean detailing a Combined Intelligence Unit.[203] The original letter, however, was not located in the same files. In fact, several exchanges between Maclean and Gullion were reclassified by the Department of State in the 1980s.

Ultimately, records demonstrated that Edmund Gullion possessed access to a wealth of information regarding atomic energy, and one can assume that his British

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[200] Top secret memorandum of conversation, "Subject: US-British Atomic Energy Policies," dated 7 August 1947. "Interchange of Information, 1945-1947," Folder 4.11.8, NARA, RG 59, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 57.

[201] Confidential letter from Edmund A. Gullion to Donald D. Maclean, dated 29 January 1948. "United Kingdom b. Atomic Development Program, 1938-1952," Folder 21.89, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 53; Confidential letter from Edmund A. Gullion to Donald D. Maclean, dated 24 March 1948. "United Kingdom General, 1946-1952," Folder 21.89, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 53.

[202] Top secret record of conversation by Roger Makins, dated 1 February 1947. "Interchange of Information, 1945-1947," Folder 4.11.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 57; Top secret letter from Donald D. Maclean to Edmund A. Gullion, dated 19 February 1947. "Interchange of Information, 1945-1947," Folder 4.11.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 57.

[203] Unknown note, dated 9 September 1948. "CPC d. Meetings + Agendas, 1945-1951," Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 55.

counterpart held similar privileges. Maclean's position in the CPC alone gave him repeated access to figures such as Dean Acheson, George Kennan and Dr. Vannevar Bush, and there appeared to be a certain level of informality involved conduct of CPC meetings, specifically in the exchange of notes.[204] Records from a top secret CPC meeting dated December 10, 1947 stated: "each government will confirm to the others in an exchange of notes, or by conclusions to be recorded in the minutes of the CPC, or other such informal means as may be appropriate and agreeable to the parties, its intentions with respect to the policies it proposes to follow as developed in these discussions."[205] As the British Secretary for the CPC, Maclean would have managed compilation of the notes and their exchange.

In the highly interconnected realm of atomic energy in the 1940s, Maclean's contacts extended far beyond just those in the CPC. Dean Acheson, Dr. Robert J. Oppenheimer and Dr. Vannevar Bush – Bush was also a member of the CPC until 1947 – were members of the Secretary of State's Committee to assess and navigate creating an atomic energy commission under the auspices of the United Nations.[206] On November 15, 1945, President Truman, Prime Minister Atlee and Prime Minister King signed a Three-Nation Agreed Declaration, enabling the three countries to engage in the "exchange of fundamental scientific information…for peaceful ends with any nation that

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[204] Top secret memorandum, "Meeting, Combined Policy Committee," dated 10 December 1947. "Interchange of Information, 1945-1947," Folder 4.11.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 57; Top secret memorandum from E. A. Gullion to Mr. Secretary, "Combined Policy Committee Meeting," dated 1 February 1947.

[205] Top secret memorandum, "U.S.-U.K.-Canadian Atomic Energy Conversations," dated 10 December 1947. "Interchange of Information, 1945-1947," Folder 4.11.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 57.

[206] Letter from Edmund A. Gullion to Dean Acheson, dated 16 May 1947. "CDA General, 1946-1952," Folder 4.7, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 54; Letter from James F. Byrnes to Harry S. Truman, dated 9 October 1945. "CPC General, 1946-1951," Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 55; Press statement, dated 25 January 1946. "Personnel: Secretary's Atomic Energy Committee," Folder 1.C.6, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 2.

will fully reciprocate." The resulting commission – the UN Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) – was intended to advise the UN on international atomic energy policy.[207] Maclean, as one would assume, also had connections to the UNAEC's UK delegation, including the Honorable Sir Alexander Montagu George Cadogan and Sir James Chadwick. Cadogan was the permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the British Office from 1938 until becoming the UK Representative to the UNAEC. Chadwick had worked on the Tube Alloys project in 1943 and was then transferred to Washington "to lead a team of British scientific coworkers in the atomic bomb project."[208]

As a result of overlapping membership between commissions and organizations dealing with international atomic energy policy, it can be expected that Maclean was well informed of cleavages in U.S. and UK opinion regarding approaches to Moscow and potential USSR possession of the atomic bomb. For instance, a confidential letter from Frederick Osborn, American Secretary for the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, to Senator Warren Austin, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, expressed concern regarding Sir Cadogan's opinion that the UNAEC should make serious concessions to plans for controlling nuclear research and development "so as to bring the Russians in." According to Osborn, Acheson was so concerned that this attitude would cause a rift in relations with the British that he intended to call the British Ambassador immediately and

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[207] Memorandum, date unknown. "Policy 3. UNAEC Policy, 1945-1949 (Folder 1 of 2)," Folder 15F, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 21.
[208] "Representatives to the Atomic Energy Commission: Biographical Sketches Available." "Communications: Biographic Information, UNAEC, 1946-1948," Folder 1.A.2., NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 1.

to send Arneson to London to follow up.[209] At a top secret meeting nine days later, R. Gordon Arneson – a member of the U.S. Delegation to the UNAEC and Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State – noted he was "most anxious that the U.K. and the U.S. not show any major differences between them in the presence of the Soviet and Polish representatives."[210] According to his notes, Arneson made it very clear to Roger Makins during a meeting they held in London, that the U.S. would not sign an inadequate agreement on atomic development just because the Russians continued to negate the U.S. "perfectionist" approach.[211]

As breakdowns in the UNAEC negotiations continued, Maclean remained very much involved. He was present at a meeting on August 13, 1947 between the British Charge d'Affaires, and State Department representatives, Gullion and Under Secretary Lovett. The gathering was held to discuss both parties' desire to prevent the UNAEC negotiations from closing, but also to address the serious matters on which neither party could seem to agree.[212] Although the U.S. did not want to compromise with the Soviets to the extent that the British were willing, Frederick Osborn emphasized to Senator Austin at the UN that, "if there is to be a break with Russia it should not be made through

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[209] Top secret memorandum of conversation, "Subject: US-British Atomic Energy Policies," dated 7 August 1947. "Interchange of Information, 1945-1947," Folder 4.11.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 57; Confidential letter from Frederick Osborn to Warren Austin, dated 10 June 1947. "Policy 3. UNAEC Policy, 1945-1949 (Folder 1 of 2)," Folder 15F, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 21.

[210] Top secret memorandum from R. Gordon Arneson to George Elsey, "Subject: Desire of Senator Bricker to see copy of Quebec Agreement," dated 4 May 1950. "Quebec Agreement + Correspondence re, 1943-1952," Folder 4.11.3, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 56; Top secret memorandum from R. Gordon Arneson, "Notes of Wednesday, June 18, Meeting, 2:30 P.M.," dated 19 June 1947. "Policy 10. Arneson's Mission – UK, 1947," Folder 15F, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 65.

[211] Top secret memorandum from R. Gordon Arneson, "Notes of Wednesday, June 18, Meeting, 2:30 P.M.," dated 19 June 1947.

[212] Top secret memorandum of conversation, "Subject: British view in regard to breakdown in the present negotiations of the Atomic Energy Commission," dated 13 August 1947. "Policy 10. Arneson's Mission – UK, 1947," Folder 15F, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 65.

the AEC."[213] In April 1948, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations even wrote directly to Gullion to express their fear that the Soviets might acquire an atomic bomb by the end of the year.[214] It is certain that Maclean must have possessed a keen awareness of U.S. sentiments regarding nuclear policy and the Soviets.

Maclean was also in an opportune position to witness a number of incidents that contributed to strained relations between the U.S. and the UK over atomic energy matters. Maclean was in Washington in December 1946, while Gullion and Acheson scurried to mitigate confusion and suspicion caused by a statement made by Prime Minister Atlee in the House of Commons. In response to a contentious question about the use of atomic bombs on Japan, Atlee had provided information outside the confines of that which had already been cleared by American authorities. Moreover, it was Maclean's colleague, Gullion, who had originally cleared the proposed reply with Makins.[215] Considering the extent to which Gullion had access to such sensitive materials and correspondence – he even possessed clearance to draft responses on behalf of President Truman to British Ambassador, Lord Iverchapel - one could deduce that Maclean shared similar access to top secret U.S.-UK correspondence.[216]

Relations between the U.S. and UK became particularly challenging after Congress passed the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, which "prohibit[ed] the disclosure to

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[213] Confidential letter from Frederick Osborn to Warren R. Austin, dated 5 August 1947. "2. UNAEC Program of Work, 1946-1949," Folder 15F, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 21.
[214] Confidential letter from Richard L. Davies to Edmund A. Gullion, dated 31 March 1948. "U.S. Government 2. AEC General, 1946-1948," Folder 16, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 37.
[215] Secret letter from Edmund A. Gullion to Dean Acheson, dated 4 December 1946. "United Kingdom b. Atomic Development Program, 1948-1952," Folder 21.89, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 53.
[216] Top secret letter from Harry S. Truman to Lord Iverchapel, P.C., G.C.M.G., dated 23 December 1946. "Quebec Agreement + Correspondence re, 1943-1952," Folder 4.11.3, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 56.

foreign nations of all 'restricted data', including the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes."[217] This caused significant concern on the British side that the new Act (S. 1717, the McMahon Bill) would impinge on the work of the CPC and CDT. The concern was legitimate, since the Act transferred control over U.S. participation in the CDT to a newly formed U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (U.S.A.E.C.).[218] State department officials addressed British concerns by explaining to Roger Makins that "careful perusal of S. 1717, as it passed the Senate, indicates that it does not contain any provision which automatically affects the Combined Development Trust."[219]

Furthermore, following passage of S. 1717 atomic energy officers at the Department of State drafted a detailed proposal outlining and analyzing the extent to which they were still free to exchange information with the British without violating the new legislation. The British were eager to build an atomic energy plant and needed assistance. In order to assist without jeopardizing U.S.-UK atomic energy cooperation, a conclusion was reached to allow the British to present their U.S. colleagues with a list of "information desired." This allowed American control over what sort of information they found fit to share.[220] Since the CPC was responsible for the tripartite exchange of information, it is likely that British demands were communicated through Maclean and his colleagues on the CPC. This gave Maclean insight into not only the type of

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[217] Top secret letter from Captain Robert A. Lavender, USN (Ret.) to Dr. Vannevar Bush, dated 28 January 1947. "CPC General, 1946-1951," Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 55.
[218] Top secret memorandum to Mr. Secretary, "Combined Policy Committee Meeting, Monday, February 3, " dated 1 February 1947. "CPC General, 1946-1951," Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 55.
[219] Top secret draft letter to Roger Makins, date unknown. "CDA General, 1946-1952," Folder 4.7, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 54.
[220] Top secret policy paper, "Summary: Problem – To define American policy with respect to kind and amount of information to be furnished the U.K. in the field of atomic energy," dated 27 January 1947. "Interchange of Information, 1945-1947," Folder 4.11.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 57.

information sought by the British, but also the sort of atomic energy specifics the U.S. ultimately refused to provide.

Maclean would have also been exposed to differing opinions between various U.S. government agencies over what to share with America's two atomic energy allies. In January 1947, retired Captain Robert A. Lavender of the U.S. Navy wrote to Dr. Vannevar Bush. Lavender wrote with regards to a CPC meeting that addressed a request from Roger Makins to allow non-CPC countries to file for applications "covering inventions and disclosures relating to atomic energy." Lavender explicitly considered this proposal to be a security risk and a direct violation of the Atomic Energy Act.[221] Only partially heeding Lavender, Dr. Bush insisted at the CPC meeting of February 3, 1947 that, while "security considerations would not allow the filing of such applications at the present time…the matter should be further examined." He also encouraged a "complete interchange of patents" between the three CPC countries.[222]

Tensions between the Department of State and Department of Defense (DOD) perpetuated and, in August 1948, Dr. Bush wrote a letter to the Secretary of Defense explaining that it had been absolutely necessary to reinitiate the CPC in 1947 for the renewed acquisition and allocation of raw materials. He also expressed his shock at the DOD's suspicion of Britain's desire to obtain their own atomic bomb.[223] The Department of Defense remained suspicious of British intentions and refused to share a top secret film entitled "Bombs" in August 1948, and then declined to comment on the response that

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[221] Top secret letter from Captain Robert A. Lavender, USN (Ret.) to Dr. Vannevar Bush, dated 28 January 1947.
[222] Top secret paper, "Abstract from draft minutes of Combined Policy Committee Meeting held at the State Department on February 3rd, 1947," date unknown. "CPC General, 1946-1951," Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 55.
[223] Secret memorandum from Dr. Vannevar Bush to the Secretary of Defense, dated 12 August 1948. "CPC General, 1946-1951," Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 55.

British requests for access to restricted technical information would continue through the mechanism of the CPC.[224]

In addition to possessing a solid command of tripartite atomic energy policy, Maclean's role in the CPC also gave him access to charts and figures disclosing global uranium acquisition and allocation. Even as the McMahon Bill was implemented in 1946, the CDT and CPC continued their original functions to "acquire and undertake the treatment and disposal of uranium and thorium materials." Furthermore, all material "acquired by the Trust [was to] be held by it in trust for the two Governments jointly, and disposed of or otherwise dealt with in accordance with the direction of the Combined Policy Committee."[225] On January 30, 1947, before the next CPC meeting, the CDT Chair, Carroll L. Wilson reminded the CPC Chair that the 6-month allocation agreement from July 31, 1946 was in need of renewal. The memo disclosed that during this period the United States had received a total of 1,987 tons of contained U_3O_8 and that the UK had received 1857 tons through various shipments.[226] Surely Maclean, as a participant at the next CPC meeting on February 3, 1947, was aware of both these figures and of the need to develop a renewed allocation agreement.[227] If Maclean was present during discussions to determine the new agreement, then he probably also possessed knowledge of the sources of the raw materials, shipment schedules and allocations.

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[224] Secret letter from D. F. Carpenter in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to Robert A. Lovett et al., dated 3 August 1948. "CPC Subgroups d. Subcommittee on Information (Technical Cooperation Pursuant to Modus Vivendi of 1-7-48)," Folder 4.10, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 56.

[225] Top secret memorandum, "Statement to Combined Policy Committee on Combined Development Trust Financial Policy," dated 26 July 1946. "CPC General, 1946-1951," Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 55.

[226] Top secret memorandum from Carroll L. Wilson to the Chairman of the Combined Policy Committee, dated 30 January 1947. "CPC General, 1946-1951," Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 55.

[227] Confidential memorandum, "Subject: Donald Maclean," drafted 2 December 1955. "Country File: UK c. Burgess & Maclean, 1951-1956," Folder 21.89, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 525.

As the year progressed, Maclean's stock as a Soviet informant continued to rise. A reinvigorated CPC meant an influx of documents pertaining to uranium sources around the world; acquiring raw materials was once again the CPC's primary mission. A top secret State Department memo dated October 24, 1947 outlined their goals. It was titled: "Recommendations concerning a program of negotiations with the British and Canadian governments designed to overcome present misunderstandings and to increase the amount of uranium ore available to the United States."[228] A reenergized CPC and CDA set to work determining the "total probable uranium production during the period 1948-1952." The final estimation was 12,880 tons from resources in the Belgian Congo, the United States, Canada, South Africa and Portugal.[229] Another top secret State Department document dated December 16, 1947 elaborated on additional sources, stating that "the United Kingdom [would] continue to use every endeavor to press for and assist in the acquisition of control by the Dominion governments (Canada excluded), the governments of India and Burma, of deposits situated in their respective territories with a view to bringing under the jurisdiction of the Combined Development Agency, by purchase or otherwise, all deposits of uranium and thorium situated in such territories."[230]

Clearly Maclean was assigned to the CPC at a particularly productive period of renewed collaboration. Of course, throughout this period "the three governments [were under strict instruction not to] disclose any information or enter into negotiations

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[228] Top secret paper, "Recommendations concerning a program of negotiations with the British and Canadian governments designed to overcome present misunderstandings and to increase the amount of uranium ore available to the United States," dated 24 October 1947. "Tripartite Negotiations, US-UK-Canada, 1943-1947," Folder 4.11.4, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 56.

[229] Top secret memorandum from Carroll L. Wilson, Chairman of the Combined Development Agency, to the Chairman, Combined Policy Committee," dated 23 July 1948. "CPC j. Uranium Resources, 1947-1949," Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 55.

[230] Top secret draft paper, dated 16 December 1947. "CPC General, 1946-1951," Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 55.

concerning atomic energy with other governments or authorities or persons in other countries."[231] Surely they could not have imagined that their activities had been made almost entirely transparent to the Soviets, courtesy of their very own British Secretary.

In October 1948, Maclean was sent to Cairo as the Head of Chancery at the British Embassy, a grand appointment for a man of only thirty-five.[232] Unfortunately, relations with his new NKVD controller were so strained that Maclean suggested he and his family defect to Russia immediately.[233] A moderately irrational request at the time, it did foreshadow the mental deterioration that would plague Maclean while in Cairo. His drinking increased dramatically and it was said that he tried to strangle Melinda in a fit of rage in front of friends and colleagues.[234] Another source alleged that Maclean exchanged punches with a coworker that night.[235] The final straw occurred at the end of an all-day drinking bender in which Maclean and his friend, Philip Toynbee, forced their way into the apartment of the U.S. Ambassador's secretary. They proceeded to trash the apartment in her presence: "they smashed the furniture and the bathtub, then began ripping up the girl's clothes and flushing them down the toilet…after this they set to work drinking every drop of alcohol they could find." This continued until the girl managed to call the police.[236] Maclean was granted six months of sick leave for psychiatric consultation, returning to London on May 11, 1950. On November 1, 1950 he was reinstated as the head of the American Department in London.[237]

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[231] Top secret paper, "Recommendations concerning a program of negotiations with the British and Canadian governments designed to overcome present misunderstandings and to increase the amount of uranium ore available to the United States," dated 24 October 1947.
[232] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 163.
[233] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 164.
[234] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 94.
[235] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 172.
[236] ibid, 172.
[237] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 97-100.

In 1948 two VENONA decrypts from June 1945 pointed to a wartime mole at the British Embassy in Washington.[238] The mole hunt was prolonged for over a year because British counter-intelligence refused to believe that an English diplomat could ever "betray the English crown." The search was therefore isolated to the clerical and technical staff.[239] By early 1951 the first name on the remaining list of suspects was Donald Maclean.[240] The clincher had been a message from New York to Moscow revealing that HOMER had traveled between D.C. and New York to visit his pregnant wife.[241] Burgess was sent to London to encourage Maclean's defection – Maclean already knew he was under surveillance.[242] Maclean readily admitted that he would be unable to withstand interrogation.[243] He had already severed contact with the Soviets following his breakdown in 1949.[244] Armed with a timely warning from Philby, Burgess and Maclean managed to leave London a mere three days before Maclean was scheduled for interrogation by MI5.[245] Since MI5 only followed Maclean in London, and not to his home in Tatsfield in Kent, Burgess devised to rent a car and meet Maclean at his house.[246] Melinda was instructed to tell any questioning officers that a gentleman named Roger Stiles had been at the house that evening. After Maclean's thirty-eighth birthday dinner, he and Guy Burgess drove to catch the midnight boat to St. Malo.[247] From France they went to Geneva, then Berne, then Zurich, and finally to Prague, where NKVD agents

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[238] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 191-192.
[239] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 272.
[240] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 276.
[241] Kerr, "Investigating Soviet Espionage", 108-109.
[242] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 291.
[243] ibid, 279.
[244] ibid, 277.
[245] ibid, 290.
[246] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 115.
[247] ibid, 116-117.

escorted them to Soviet territory. They arrived in the USSR on Sunday, May 27, 1951.[248] The authorities in Britain did not know that Maclean was missing until Monday, May 28, the day of his scheduled interrogation.[249]

Melinda and the children were so hounded by the media that they moved to Switzerland; the security services claimed they did not have the right to detain her.[250] Melinda and their three children - Fergus, Donald Junior and little Melinda – joined Maclean in Moscow in September 1953.[251] On October 4, 1953 the Russian press denied the presence of Burgess or Maclean in the USSR and dismissed the allegation as a Western conspiracy.[252] It was not until February 1956 that public statements from both men were published.[253]

Maclean's defection posed serious consequences for U.S.-UK relations, particularly in the realm of atomic energy. Not only did it foster distrust between U.S. Department of State officials and their British contacts, it also caused a considerable rift in the relationship between the Department of State, other U.S. government agencies and the U.S. Congress. After the Klaus Fuchs espionage case in 1950, the Department of State and Congress were already wary of continuing to exchange atomic information with the British. After all, in March 1949, the UK House of Commons had announced that the British were three years away from attaining their own bomb after help from the U.S. and

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[248] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 209.
[249] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 18.
[250] ibid, 23-24.
[251] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 246.
[252] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 149.
[253] ibid, 152-155.

Fuchs.[254] Within a year, the world had discovered that Fuchs was actually a Soviet spy.[255]

Following Fuchs' conviction, attention was soon directed towards the Combined Policy Committee, which acted as the primary vehicle for the exchange of atomic energy information between the U.S and the UK. In May 1950, Senator Bricker, a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, contacted the Department of State requesting access to the original Quebec Agreement. As it turned out, the Agreement itself "contained no specific security provisions;" in fact, it was originally intended that the specific security provisions be "handled by the Combined Policy Committee established under the Agreement."[256] Since Fuchs was not a member of the CPC, the more pressing concern was that an organization that controlled foreign countries' access to atomic energy information existed outside of Congress's control. However, one can only imagine the uproar when Maclean, a foreign member of the CPC, defected just the following year.

Years before the Fuchs case, the relationship between Congress and State had been strained. After passage of the McMahon Act in 1946, Dean Acheson had addressed the CPC to ensure that there would not be any significant restriction in the exchange of information, largely because the Committee had been created under a wartime agreement and, therefore, Congress had never been briefed as to the extent of its activities. Acheson

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[254] Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons, dated 14 May 1948? "United Kingdom b. Atomic Development Program, 1948-1952," Folder 21.89, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 53.

[255] Top secret paper, "Tripartite talks on security standards at Washington, 19th-21st June, 1950," dated 7 October 1950. "Raw Materials – Supply Requirements, 1946-1952," Folder 4.11.18, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 58.

[256] Top secret memorandum from R. Gordon Arneson to George Elsey, "Subject: Desire of Senator Bricker to see copy of Quebec Agreement," dated 4 May 1950. "Quebec Agreement + Correspondence re, 1943-1952," Folder 4.11.3, NARA, RG 59, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 56.

made an effort to comfort British and Canadian members at the meeting by ensuring that their governments would be consulted should it become necessary to disclose their work to Congress.[257] It was not until August 1947 that Senator Bourne B. Hickenlooper and other members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy discovered the existence of a secret Quebec Agreement and the CPC. Hickenlooper, who served as Chairman of the Joint Committee, immediately contacted Secretary of State Marshall to express his "shock" and astonishment at the existence of such an agreement. He articulated the Committee's concern that foreign enemies would target British stockpiles and he demanded "the Quebec Agreement be mutually rescinded."[258] Clearly, this did not deter the American side of the CPC, which continued to operate with President Truman's approval.[259]

After the defections of Burgess and Maclean, the CPC came under much more serious scrutiny from Congress. The general sentiment within Congress, and perhaps the U.S. government as a whole, was best summarized in George Smathers' letter to Secretary of State Acheson on June 18, 1951. Smathers, a member of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, wrote:

> "Like many others I am tremendously disturbed about the disappearance of the two British Foreign Office men, Donald Duart MacLean and Guy Francis de Moncy Burgess. The record over the past three years as far as major leaks of vital information to the communists reveals that the ones

[257] Top secret memorandum to Mr. Secretary, "Combined Policy Committee Meeting, Monday, February 3, " dated 1 February 1947. "CPC General, 1946-1951," Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 55.
[258] Letter from Bourne B. Hickenlooper to George C. Marshall, dated 29 August 1947. "Quebec Agreement + Correspondence re, 1943-1952," Folder 4.11.3, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 56.
[259] Memorandum for the President from George C. Marshall, dated 6 September 1947. "CPC f. Membership CPC, ASCPC + CDT, 1945-1950."

most dangerous to the United States have come from men high up in either the Canadian or the British government."[260]

Within a few weeks of this statement, Arneson sent a package of "published" materials on the Quebec Agreement and CPC to Senator Albrook, as had been requested.[261] On August 31, 1951, in a response to Senator Brien McMahon (author of the McMahon Act), Assistant Secretary of State, Jack McFall, appeared eager to deflect the Maclean case to other agencies. He referred McMahon to the CIA, Department of Justice (DOJ) and U.S.A.E.C. for more information, and assured McMahon that the British Embassy in Washington had reported no documents to be missing. McFall also made sure to emphasize that Maclean was "not a scientist" and had only served the CPC in a secretarial capacity until his departure from the United States in August 1948.[262]

The press was poised to sensationalize the double defection. In a Washington press report from June 7, 1951 it was claimed that "several senators said [the disappearance of two British Foreign Service officials] was a shocking thing and that Acheson would be questioned about it at the afternoon session of the Committee."[263] Later that same day Secretary of State Acheson was reported telling Senators that "it would be a 'very serious matter' if two missing British diplomats proved to have Russian sympathies." Asked about Maclean's role as "Head of the American Department of the

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[260] Letter from George Smathers to Dean Acheson, dated 18 June 1951. "Country File: UK c. Burgess & Maclean, 1951-1956," Folder 21.89, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 525.
[261] Letter from R. Gordon Arneson to Robert Albrook, dated 10 July 1951. "CPC General, 1946-1951," Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 55.
[262] Confidential letter from Jack K. McFall to Brien McMahon, dated 13 August 1951. "Country File: United Kingdom c. Burgess & Maclean 1951-56," Folder 21.89, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 525.
[263] AP. Washington., "Following taken from Miss Griffiths at 2:40 p.m., June 7, 1951," dated 7 June 1951. "Country File: United Kingdom c. Burgess & Maclean 1951-56," Folder 21.89, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 525.

British Foreign Office," Acheson replied that "'[Maclean] did have knowledge of what our discussions were in Paris' at the Foreign Ministers meeting on Atlantic Pact problems."[264] Maclean's knowledge of the North Atlantic Pact was still of concern five years later. A draft State Department memorandum from February 1, 1956 discussed Senator Eastland's concerns as Chairman of the International Security Committee that Maclean may have informed China that the U.S. was opposed to going to war with mainland China in the event that China invade Korea. The report, however, claimed that Maclean had only partial knowledge of the North Atlantic Treaty from its very early stages.[265]

British and U.S. authorities made every effort to downplay Maclean's role in atomic energy matters. After consulting State Department officials, Senator McMahon's draft statement confirmed that while Maclean had access to top secret information his skills were not comparable to those of Fuchs and that the British Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, publicly claimed "Maclean had no access to confidential technical information."[266] According to further press reports from June, 1951 the State Department continued to "claim no official knowledge of the case." One State Department source was even alleged to say: "this is a British matter - ask them."[267] A press release from the following day purported that officials from State and the CIA would "make strong

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[264] AP. Washington., "Following taken over phone from Miss Griffiths, 3:40 p.m., June 7, 1951," dated 7 June 1951. "Country File: United Kingdom c. Burgess & Maclean 1951-56," Folder 21.89, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 525.
[265] Confidential draft memorandum, "Proposed answer to Senator Eastland's questions on Burgess and Maclean," dated 16 January 1956. "Country File: United Kingdom c. Burgess & Maclean 1951-56," Folder 21.89, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 525.
[266] Draft statement, "Draft of proposed statement by Senator McMahon," dated 26 June 1951. "Country File: United Kingdom c. Burgess & Maclean 1951-56," Folder 21.89, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 525.
[267] UP. Washington., "Taken over phone from Miss Griffiths, SA-M, 11:30 a.m., June 7, 1951," dated 7 June 1951. "Country File: United Kingdom c. Burgess & Maclean 1951-56," Folder 21.89, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 525.

representations that the Foreign Office should clean house regardless of whom they hurt…[and] that in the State Department repeated drunkenness, recurrent nervous breakdowns, sexual deviation, and other human frailties are considered security hazards and persons showing any one or more of them are dismissed summarily."[268] Even Foreign Secretary Morrison faced similar accusations from members of the House of Commons who questioned "whether there was widespread sexual perversion in the Foreign Office," clearly referring to the rather notorious private lives of Maclean and Burgess.[269]

The relationship between the U.S. and the UK was in trouble. In a secret letter dated October 10, 1952 Arneson – special assistant to the Secretary of State – wrote to James K. Penfield at the U.S. Embassy in London expressing his suspicions of Churchill's intentions now that the British had their first atomic bomb. He elaborated: "a feeling is developing that Churchill has a trump card to play with us in the field of atomic energy collaboration…the replacement of [British Ambassador] Sir Oliver Franks by Sir Roger Makins might well be a move in this game." Arneson made very clear to Penfield that, "no matter what might develop in the way of increased collaboration, the problem of security is one that must first be resolved."[270]

After the Fuchs case, the first set of "Tripartite Talks on Security Standards" took place in Washington from June 19-21, 1950. The conference, which was held "under the

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[268] UP. Washington., "Taken from Miss Griffiths, 2:20 p.m., June 8, 1951," dated 8 June 1951. "Country File: United Kingdom c. Burgess & Maclean 1951-56," Folder 21.89, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 525.
[269] A.P. London., "Taken from Miss Holway, 2:05 p.m., June 11, 1951," dated 11 June 1951. "Country File: United Kingdom c. Burgess & Maclean 1951-56," Folder 21.89, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 525.
[270] Secret letter from R. Gordon Arneson to James K. Penfield, dated 10 October 1952. "Raw Materials – Supply Requirements, 1946-1952," Folder 4.11.18, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 58.

auspices of the Combined Policy Committee…was arranged to discuss Standards of Security in the atomic energy projects in the United Kingdom, United States of America, and Canada."[271] A top secret State Department memorandum documenting the talks, presented a fairly considerate view of the British predicament with regards to Fuchs. When the UK representative offered to present the Fuchs case in detail from the perspective of security standards, with the caveat that "no system could be perfect," Carol Wilson of the U.S.A.E.C. readily accepted. Impressively, their "account was sympathetically received and the U.S. representatives expressed their gratitude for having been given a first-hand explanation…very few questions were asked."[272]

The response was not so sympathetic after Maclean and Burgess defected the following year. In fact, as early as May 29, 1951, the day after British authorities were aware of Maclean's disappearance, Deputy Under Secretary Humelsine sent a letter to FBI Director and Chairman of the DOJ's Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, J. Edgar Hoover, requesting the Federal Bureau of Investigation's participation in a forthcoming atomic energy security standards conference between the U.S., UK and Canada. The State Department had chosen a rather monumental date to finally respond to Hoover's original letter from July 12, 1950.[273] Hoover had written a stern letter to James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary for the National Security Council, discrediting the State Department for excluding representatives of U.S. intelligence agencies from the

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[271] Top secret paper, "Tripartite talks on security standards at Washington, 19th-21st June, 1950," dated 7 October 1950. "Raw Materials – Supply Requirements, 1946-1952," Folder 4.11.18, NARA, RG 59, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 58.
[272] Top secret paper, "Tripartite talks on security standards at Washington, 19th-21st June, 1950," dated 7 October 1950. "Raw Materials – Supply Requirements, 1946-1952," Folder 4.11.18, NARA, RG 59, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 58.
[273] Secret letter from Carlisle H. Humelsine to J. Edgar Hoover, dated 29 May 1951. "Security Standards, 1950-1951," Folder 4.11.19, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 58.

1950 security standards conference, especially since the FBI had investigated the Fuchs case.[274] After all, the McMahon Act of 1946 had given the FBI freedom to investigate anyone in the atomic energy field who had access to restricted data, and also permission to question their past or present affiliations with any fascist or communist organizations.[275] What seemed odder than the timing of the letter to Hoover, however, was the fact that the Chairman of the U.S.A.E.C. did not send a proposal to the CPC Chairman calling for a second security standard conference until June 1, three days after the FBI had been asked to participate. The following day, Hoover assigned Mr. Ralph R. Roach as the FBI delegate for the upcoming conference in London.[276] On June 5, 1951, Arneson wrote to Deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert LeBaron, requesting that he appoint a representative from the Department of Defense. LeBaron agreed and assigned Brigadier General H.R. Loper, whom he later replaced with himself.[277]

According to a follow-up letter from Arneson to LeBaron on June 15, 1951, Arneson claimed that the proposal for the second conference on security standards had been "written prior to the news of the disappearance of Maclean and Burgess."[278] So the June 1st date of the original proposal either implies remarkable serendipity, or perhaps

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[274] Confidential letter from J. Edgar Hoover to James S. Lay, Jr., dated 12 July 1950. "Security Standards, 1950-1951," Folder 4.11.19, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 58.

[275] Top secret paper, "Tripartite talks on security standards at Washington, 19th-21st June, 1950," dated 7 October 1950. "Raw Materials – Supply Requirements, 1946-1952," Folder 4.11.18, NARA, RG 59, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 58.

[276] Personal and confidential letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Carlisle H. Humelsine, dated 2 June 1951. "Security Standards, 1950-1951," Folder 4.11.19, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 58.

[277] Restricted letter from Robert LeBaron to R. Gordon Arneson, dated 8 June 1951. "Security Standards, 1950-1951," Folder 4.11.19, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 58; Secret letter from Robert LeBaron to R. Gordon Arneson, dated 27 June 1951. "Security Standards, 1950-1951," Folder 4.11.19, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 58.

[278] Secret letter from R. Gordon Arneson to Robert LeBaron, dated 15 June 1951. "Security Standards, 1950-1951," Folder 4.11.19, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 58.

that certain State Department officials may have known about the Burgess and Maclean disappearance sooner than they admitted. Furthermore, Arneson informed LeBaron that the agenda of this second conference – as proposed on June 1 - had been modified because "the conference held last June did not go into the personnel investigative aspects of atomic energy security."[279] This further suggests that those State officials involved in drafting the June 1st proposal were already aware that Maclean and Burgess were missing. Of course, there is a chance it could have been coincidental.

The aim for the 1951 conference was to revise UK security investigation procedures for persons involved in atomic energy.[280] Although the State Department files at the National Archives did not include minutes from the 1951 security conference, they did include notes from the third tripartite conference in May 1952. British security questionnaires were required to include aliases, organization memberships, political affiliations and foreign travel and, in August 1952, they were required to incorporate certain questions for the applicant's spouse.[281] This was a significant change considering that, as recently as 1950, individuals in the UK weren't even notified that they were being investigated.[282] Correspondence between Arneson and Makins following the 1951 conference confirmed that revised security investigation procedures required admission

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[279] Secret letter from R. Gordon Arneson to Robert LeBaron, dated 15 June 1951. "Security Standards, 1950-1951," Folder 4.11.19, NARA, RG 59, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 58.
[280] Top secret letter from R. Gordon Arneson to Colonel W. K. Benson of the Central Intelligence Agency, dated 28 January 1952. "Security Standards, 1950-1952," Folder 4.11.19, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 58.
[281] Secret report, "Minutes of tripartite conference on atomic energy security standards, Washington, D.C., May 15 and 16, 1952," dated 2 June 1952. "Security Standards, 1950-1952," Folder 4.11.19, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 58; Secret letter from Gordon Dean, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, to Sir Archibald Rowlands, Permanent Secretary of State, Ministry of Supply, London, dated 29 August 1952. "Security Standards, 1950-1952," Folder 4.11.19, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 58.
[282] Top secret paper, "Tripartite talks on security standards at Washington, 19th-21st June, 1950," dated 7 October 1950. "Raw Materials – Supply Requirements, 1946-1952," Folder 4.11.18, NARA, RG 59, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 58.

of any past or present association with the Communist party.[283] In addition, a British press statement from March 1952 announced that anyone applying for government posts involving access to secret information, especially work pertaining to atomic energy, would be found unfit if they were members of any communist or fascist organization.[284]

The security conferences seemed to offer hope for renewed cooperation. A draft letter dated May 19, 1952 from U.S.A.E.C. Chair, Gordon Dean, to the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Oliver Franks, suggested that there was a potential for new exchange of information between the UK and U.S.. However, cooperation would only recommence if the British government could guarantee that their employees were being vetted according to the processes determined by the July 1951 security standards conference.[285] It was very apparent to both parties involved that "efforts to achieve greater cooperation…during the post-war period were greatly handicapped by the Fuchs and Maclean-Burgess cases."[286]

As for Maclean, the future of Anglo-American cooperation was no longer a priority. Instead, he made a sincere effort to actively participate in life in the Soviet Union. He became fluent in Russian and joined the Communist Party, and he virtually quit drinking. In 1961 he was employed at the Institute of World Economic and

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[283] Top secret letter from Roger M. Makins to R. Gordon Arneson, dated 17 January 1952. "Raw Materials – Supply Requirements, 1946-1952," Folder 4.11.18, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 58.
[284] Press statement from His Majesty's Government, dated 8 January 1952. "Security Standards, 1950-1952," Folder 4.11.19, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 58.
[285] Secret letter from Gordon Dean to Oliver S. Franks, dated 19 May 1952. "Security Standards, 1950-1952," Folder 4.11.19, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 58.
[286] Secret memorandum, "Anglo American cooperation in the field of Atomic Energy," dated 14 November 1958. "Combined Policy Committee General, 1955-1962," Folder 4.8, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry A1 3008-A, Box 116.

International Relations where he worked as an instructor and researcher.[287] In 1965 Melinda left Donald to move in with Kim Philby. In 1966 she went back to Donald, with whom she stayed until she returned to the United States in 1979.[288] Donald died in Moscow on March 9, 1983 and his ashes were returned to England.[289]

JOHN CAIRNCROSS – The Man in the War Ministry

John Cairncross was born into a lower middle class family in Glasgow, Scotland in 1913.[290] He received a scholarship to Cambridge University to study Modern Languages and graduated in 1936.[291] Guy Burgess was introduced to Cairncross in February 1937 by their mutual friend, Anthony Blunt.[292] Blunt had been Cairncross's French tutor at Cambridge.[293] Burgess referred to Cairncross as "a typical petit bourgeois…intoxicated with his own success, with the fact that he could raise himself to the level of the British ruling class."[294] Although a crucial member of the Cambridge Five, Cairncross was never really a part of "Burgess and Co."[295] He was a relentless worker and very spiritually committed to Marxism, but he was not of the same social class as his four colleagues. Burgess refused to personally recruit Cairncross. Due to Cairncross's volatile personality, Burgess was adamant that he not know the identities of the other agents. There was no need to jeopardize the network.[296] So Theodore Mally used Maclean's friend and Communist Party member James Klugmann to recruit

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[287] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 248-249.
[288] ibid, 260.
[289] ibid, 261.
[290] ibid, 104.
[291] ibid, 105.
[292] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 204.
[293] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 107.
[294] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 205.
[295] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 105.
[296] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 205-206.

Cairncross instead. A Moscow file dated April 9, 1937 stated: "We have already recruited Cairncross. We shall call him Molière."[297]

It remains curious that chose the codename MOLIÈRE, since Cairncross was already acknowledged among French academics for his expertise on the playwright.[298] Yuri Modin, for whom Cairncross was his first agent in 1944, made not one mention of the codename MOLIÈRE.[299] He referred to Cairncross solely as 'THE CARELIAN' (aka KARELIAN), which stood for Karelia, "a region straddling the Finnish border." It was supposed to be easy for Cairncross to remember should he need to make a getaway.[300] According to Modin, John Cairncross had an absolutely horrendous memory.[301] Nevertheless, he was highly intelligent, graduated with first class honors and was accepted into the Foreign Office in 1936.[302] Nigel West even declared that Cairncross obtained "the top marks" in his Home and Foreign Office examinations.[303] Despite his success he "was anti-social and a wretched hand at making friends" and was very much disliked by his coworkers. Modin contended Cairncross's "collaboration with the NKVD was prompted by the boundless hatred [his coworkers'] mockery provoked in him…[he] had a sizeable chip on his shoulder."[304] He was only twenty-three.

Cairncross moved between several positions at the Foreign Office during his first year including the American desk and was finally moved to the Treasury section on October 1, 1938.[305] One of his most notable pieces of intelligence during that early

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[297] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 206.
[298] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 105.
[299] ibid, 17.
[300] ibid, 17.
[301] ibid, 9.
[302] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*,107; West, *The Crown Jewels*, 210.
[303] West, *TRIPLEX*, 189.
[304] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 107.
[305] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 107; West, *The Crown Jewels*, 209.

period was derived from his work in the Foreign Office "special 'crisis' group…[where] he had free access to documents on Munich." Cairncross leaked to the Soviets that a British agent in the USSR had informed Britain of the Soviet's inability to defend Czechoslovakia. According to these documents the British Ambassador in Berlin and the British Ambassador in Paris encouraged a separate agreement with Hitler.[306]

His "cantankerous" personality might explain why Cairncross was shuffled between so many different departments within Whitehall during his career.[307] While his position in the Treasury Department did not seem promising for the NKVD at first, it turned out to be incredibly fruitful. As an officer of the Treasury he was privy to highly classified financial documents pertaining to British domestic and international activity, including intelligence service records. One of Cairncross's most valuable associates during this time was Lord Hankey's son, Henry Hanky, who was a Third Secretary in the Foreign Office. Through conversations with Henry in September 1939, Cairncross learned that the British had received Polish assistance in deciphering Soviet traffic.[308] Henry Hankey played an even greater role for the NKVD in 1940. At the time he was working as his father's personal secretary, however, Lord Hankey was under pressure from parliament to "release [his son] to the Army."[309] Cairncross, who by that time was fairly friendly with the younger Hankey, accompanied him often to his father's favorite vegetarian restaurant. Apparently under encouragement from Gorsky, Cairncross pretended to be an avid vegetarian and made a grand impression on Lord Hankey. It was

[306] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 209-210.
[307] West, *TRIPLEX*, 1.
[308] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 213.
[309] ibid, 217.

on his son's recommendation that Lord Hankey decided to employ Cairncross as his personal secretary.[310]

As Minister without Portfolio in the War Cabinet, Hankey had been commissioned to produce an "Inquiry into SIS and MI5" for Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in March 1940.[311] This document was of the utmost secrecy and intended to determine whether or not the "agencies were ready to cope with spies, saboteurs, Fifth Columnists and the challenge of fighting the enemy on the Continent."[312] The report is still highly classified and has never yet been released by the British government.[313] It was released for the first time in 2009 by Nigel West in his collection of Cambridge Five documents extracted from the KGB archives.[314] It contains such sensitive information as the status of SIS networks in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Holland; newly developed compact radio sets; legal covers provided to agents by the Passport Control Offices abroad; the creation of propaganda for "enemy countries and Russia" and an estimation that some 78,000 pieces of propaganda were smuggled into Germany each month.[315] Weaknesses within the agencies were also noted, such as the overwhelming number of persons in Britain to be vetted by MI5 and the lack of personnel available to properly complete the process.[316]

Lord Hankey was also president of an Anglo-Soviet Commission created after Operation Barbarossa. The commission was supposed to send war materials to the USSR, but Hankey influenced the commission's outright refusal to send certain weapons

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[310] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 216-217;
[311] David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1994), 83; West, *TRIPLEX*, 189.
[312] West, *TRIPLEX,*189.
[313] ibid, 189.
[314] West, *TRIPLEX*, 1-4.
[315] ibid, 190-233.
[316] ibid, 219.

that were desperately needed.[317] Cairncross also informed Moscow Centre that an Anglo-American effort to build an atomic bomb had begun in 1940 and that uranium-235 was the central component.[318] The report provided by Cairncross was *The Maud Report* and included methods of uranium-235 extraction.[319] The lack of uranium-235 was the greatest obstacle for the Soviet nuclear project, so this document was priceless.[320] In fact, Cairncross's reports on the uranium bomb catalyzed the creation of the Soviet ENORMOZ project in the fall of 1941.[321] In 1941 alone Cairncross supplied 3,449 items of intelligence to his controller.[322]

In August 1942 Cairncross was transferred to the Government Code and Cipher School at Bletchley Park as an editor/translator for the German section.[323] SIS had been deciphering ISOS and ULTRA German traffic since 1940.[324] Cairncross proceeded to pass on thousands of ULTRA documents.[325] In 1942 even Kim Philby did not have access to ULTRA intelligence.[326] One of Cairncross's greatest achievements was intelligence he obtained regarding the final German offensive against the Soviets, codenamed Operation CITADEL and planned for the summer of 1943 at Kursk. In the winter of 1942/43 Cairncross retrieved texts about new German Tiger Tanks made of thicker steel impenetrable to current Russian artillery. Tiger Tanks were to be used for the first time at the Battle of Kursk. Using data from the manuals supplied by Cairncross, the Soviets were able to reconstruct their own tanks and develop ammunition capable of defeating

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[317] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 110.
[318] ibid, 109-110.
[319] Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, 82.
[320] ibid, 100.
[321] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 233.
[322] ibid, 214.
[323] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 218.
[324] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 111-112.
[325] West, *TRIPLEX*, 189.
[326] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 112.

the Tigers.[327] In addition to tank schematics he also provided operational intelligence. He supplied complete texts of German reports on Soviet unit locations so that the Red Army Commander was able to "move all his regiments at the last minute and completely outmaneuver the enemy."[328] The intelligence also included locations of Nazi aerodromes and the Soviets launched a successful aerial attack against the Nazi aircrafts. The Soviet victory in July 1943 was due in part to John Cairncross. He was responsible for saving the "lives of tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers," and was awarded an Order of the Red Banner for his work.[329]

In 1943 Cairncross was moved to the counter-intelligence section in SIS, Section V. His superior was Kim Philby.[330] Cairncross did not discover that he and Philby were working for the same side until many years later, so logically he found it important to pass information about the Deputy Chief of Section V to his London controllers.[331] One such item was a very thorough report written by Philby's boss, Jack Curry, on NKVD methods of espionage in Britain.[332] It contained two particularly astute observations: "The NKVD recruits well-educated young people to its work in the hope that they will enter the diplomatic service and work their way up" and "all agents are well trained in avoiding surveillance."[333] Cairncross attached Philby's introductory letter to Curry's memorandum, which only helped to ensure the NKVD he was not a double agent. Philby stated simply: "given the lack of intelligence at our disposal and our overall weakness on

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[327] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 113.
[328] ibid, 113-114.
[329] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 113; ibid 5.
[330] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 114.
[331] West, *TRIPLEX*, 189.
[332] ibid, 233.
[333] ibid, 238-239.

the issues in question [the memo] is far from complete."[334] In actual fact the report made several accurate assessments. Unbeknownst to Jack Curry, the Soviets owed their skill in avoiding British surveillance to Anthony Blunt, who passed his own official report on MI5 surveillance techniques to the NKVD.[335]

As an officer in subsection V-03, Cairncross was assigned the task of destroying old intercepts. The texts obtained by V-03 consisted of details and locations of "German military counter-intelligence stations working against the Soviet Union."[336] Gorsky reported that, in the mere two or three months that Cairncross worked in V-03, he passed approximately 1500 of these intercepts to Moscow.[337]

In August 1944 Cairncross was transferred to SIS Section I, the Political Department, during which time he supplied interesting SIS reports on the USSR since 1939.[338] He also provided lengthy lists of SIS agents working in "Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, Portugal and South America."[339] In June 1945 he was recalled to the Treasury Department.[340] He had provided the NKVD with 5,823 documents since 1941.[341] However, after the October 1945 defection of Igor Gouzenko contact with Cairncross was broken.[342] It was not resumed until 1948 with the arrival of a new and very young NKVD officer, Yuri Modin.[343]

From 1948 to 1951 Cairncross dealt primarily with War Office personnel, but more importantly he shared an office and safe with George Oram. Oram dealt directly

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[334] West, *TRIPLEX*, 234.
[335] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 90-91.
[336] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 219.
[337] ibid, 219.
[338] ibid, 220.
[339] ibid, 221.
[340] ibid, 221.
[341] ibid, 171.
[342] ibid, 222.
[343] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 19.

with defense supplies so Cairncross - or KAREL, an abbreviated version of THE KARELIAN - copied articles of interest from Oram's files on the Korean War and the atomic bomb.[344] In 1ate 1948 he joined the group consigned to finances for the future NATO. He provided plans for nuclear arms in West Germany and particulars on American bases set up in Scandinavia and the Mediterranean.[345] He was transferred to the Ministry of Supply on May 1, 1951 where he "received papers from the War Office, the Joint War Production Committee, the Committee on Production Capacity and other government departments including the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Cabinet."[346] Between June and July 1951 he provided 1,339 pages of documents.[347]

Cairncross emerged relatively unscathed after the defections of Burgess and Maclean. Still, during a thorough search of Guy Burgess's apartment in 1951, MI5 found a letter they were eventually able to connect to Cairncross.[348] To the horror of the Americans, Cairncross was secretly interrogated and permitted to resettle with his wife in Rome, working for the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.[349] When Anthony Blunt was exposed as a member of the Cambridge Ring in 1979 it was revealed shortly thereafter that Cairncross had been the 'fifth man.'[350] He separated from his wife, Gabriella, and moved to France where spent the remainder of his life with a young

[344] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 222-223.
[345] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 167; ibid, 171.
[346] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 223-225.
[347] ibid, 225.
[348] ibid, 226.
[349] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 4.
[350] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 226.

American woman named Gayle.[351] He died in France in October 1995 and his memoirs were published posthumously in 1997.[352]

GUY BURGESS – The Man with Many Friends

Guy Frances de Moncy Burgess was the most flamboyant of the Cambridge Five, referred to by David Leitch as the "most eccentric and preposterous spy since Mata Hari."[353] Yet to his handler, Yuri Modin, Burgess was the "real leader," the man who "held the group together [and] infused it with his energy."[354] He possessed a "romantic enthusiasm for espionage" and often quoted Marx, Lenin and Stalin in conversation.[355] Despite living in a time and place where homosexuality was punishable by law, Burgess made no attempt to disguise his sexuality and his boundless charm won over many men throughout his career, typically men of great intelligence value to the Soviets.[356] Burgess was capable of making even his NKVD controller blush. (He once suggested they pose as lovers as a cover for their secret meeting.)[357] However, with this fondness for shock appeal came a deeply entrenched fragility and Burgess eventually drank himself to death in Moscow.[358]

Guy Burgess was born into a wealthy British family in 1910.[359] Since the family legacy lay in the Navy, young Burgess was sent to Dartmouth's Royal Naval College. He stayed for two years before abruptly transferring to Eton; speculation remains as to

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[351] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 218-219.
[352] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 226; John Cairncross, *The Enigma Spy: The Story of the Man Who Changed the Course of World War Two* (London: Century, 1997).
[353] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 13; Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 10.
[354] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 2.
[355] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 162-163.
[356] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 3; Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 40; ibid, 43.
[357] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 152.
[358] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 256.
[359] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 13; Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 42.

the reason for his sudden departure.[360] At Eton, Burgess excelled in his studies and was accepted to Trinity College with a scholarship to study History in 1930.[361] Oxford and Cambridge Universities were both rich "hunting grounds" for the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB).[362] As discussed earlier with consideration to Philby's motives, Marx and Leninism had become very popular amongst the young intellectual elites in 1930s Britain, largely due to global depression and the rise of Fascism.[363] Burgess joined the Communist Party at Cambridge and became a very active member.[364]

Burgess met Anthony Blunt at university and introduced the politically apathetic art connoisseur to Marxism.[365] They were friends and lovers, and Blunt remained devoted to Burgess until the day he died.[366] In turn, Blunt introduced Burgess to the secret world of The Apostles, a society presided over by John Maynard Keynes and reserved for those who had reached the "pinnacles of Cambridge intellectualism."[367] As a member of The Apostles, Burgess was introduced to Maurice Dobb and a "young and brilliant undergraduate by the name of Harold 'Kim' Philby."[368] Burgess also had an affair with Donald Maclean while at Cambridge.[369] As one will soon see, Leitch's 'Mata Hari' reference was hardly an exaggeration.

Burgess's recruitment has been disputed. Borovik maintained that Burgess was last on Philby's list of seven candidates, while Modin was certain that Burgess had been

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[360] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 65.
[361] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 66; Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 37.
[362] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 44.
[363] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 12.
[364] ibid, 43-44.
[365] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 129-130.
[366] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 67-69.
[367] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 67; Carter, *Anthony Blunt*, 61.
[368] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 67.
[369] ibid, 96.

Philby's first choice and recruited as early as May 1934.[370] Borovik claimed that Burgess was quick to notice Maclean's sudden shift from Communism in December 1934 and he accused Maclean of working for the Comintern incessantly. Eventually Burgess's desire to be included was obliged, if only for the safety of the infant network.[371] Miranda Carter quoted Philby as having said that Burgess was recruited sometime between December 1934 and February 1935.[372] This timeline conflicts with Modin and Purdy's accounts of Burgess and Blunt's trip to the USSR in 1934, directly after which they conspicuously renounced their Communist beliefs and associations.[373] Modin also suggested that Burgess played a role in Maclean's recruitment.[374] Either way, Nigel West confirmed that Philby, Burgess and Maclean were all recruited to work for the NKVD in 1934 and instructed to distance themselves from any Communist or Socialist connections immediately following.[375]

Guy Burgess, codenamed MÄDCHEN ("Maiden") was, in the words of the Soviet Spymaster Alexander Orlov, "a cultural pederast."[376] As a result, this "predatory homosexual" was assigned the difficult job of talent spotter and recruiter.[377] Burgess began by successfully recruiting Blunt in January 1937.[378] Blunt, still a don at Cambridge, approached Michael Straight and Leo Long at Burgess's request.[379] Despite Burgess's talents, he was not always successful: his proposal to classmate Goronwy Rees was refused, but fortunately for Burgess Rees did not come forward about the attempt

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[370] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 42; Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 53.
[371] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 48-49.
[372] Miranda Carter, *Anthony Blunt: His Lives* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), 160-161.
[373] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 72-73; Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 45-46.
[374] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 96.
[375] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 127.
[376] ibid, 128.
[377] ibid, 127-128.
[378] ibid, 133.
[379] ibid, 133.

until after Guy's defection in 1951.[380] Nigel West contended that Rees initially accepted the offer to work for the Soviets in 1938, but reneged on his commitment following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939.[381]

After Cambridge, Burgess worked as a financial adviser to Lady Rothschild. Her son, Victor Rothschild, was a close friend of Guy's from Trinity.[382] The Rothschild family provided an incredible entrée into the governmental elite of Britain. Through them Burgess met MI6 Chief Stewart Menzies, and the head of MI5's B Division, Dick White. He also met Winston Churchill, who was apparently "delighted by [Burgess's] intelligence and subtlety."[383] This introduction turned out to be timely and fruitful, since Burgess was then granted an interview with Churchill in September 1938, just as the Munich Agreement between Chamberlain and Hitler was under negotiation.[384]

In 1935 Burgess was employed as the assistant to a "young extreme right-wing Conservative MP", and homosexual, Jack MacNamara.[385] No doubt this was an attempt to further promote Burgess's anti-Communist façade. Apparently his employer's unrelenting right-wing perspectives began to wear on Burgess and he confessed to an unidentified close friend that: "I am a Comintern agent and have been ever since I left Cambridge….why else do you think I left the Party and left Cambridge and took that absurd job with that ridiculous M.P.?"[386] According to Purdy, not the most credible of sources, this friend did not report the incident to MI5 until after Burgess defected in 1951. Nevertheless, Burgess did exhibit risky behavior on several occasions throughout

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[380] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 173.
[381] West, *The Crown Jewels,* 143.
[382] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 76-77.
[383] ibid, 77.
[384] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 52.
[385] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 77.
[386] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 50-51.

his covert career, so Purdy's account should not be dismissed. It is unlikely that this "friend" was Goronwy Rees, because their relationship had been severely strained since 1939. Burgess perceived Rees as such a threat to the network that he declared, "the only way out of the situation was the physical liquidation of [Rees]."[387]

In spite of his ideological conundrum, Burgess continued to accompany MacNamara on his escapades around Europe. Along the way Burgess became acquainted with another "flamboyant homosexual" by the name of Édouard Pfeiffer. Pfeiffer was none other than principle aid to the current French Minister of War, and soon-to-be French Premier, Édouard Daladier. Pfeiffer was also an agent for the Deuxième Bureau.[388] In 1936 Burgess began working for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) through which he met and interviewed David Footman, Assistant Director of the Political Section (I) at MI6.[389] Allegedly Footman approached Burgess in 1938 to offer him a trial position with MI6 if he could "use his contacts in the international homosexual milieu to open a discreet line of communication" between Chamberlain and Daladier.[390] Documents were passed between Burgess and Pfeiffer and these secret talks culminated in the 1938 Munich Agreement and the Franco-German Pact.[391]

Burgess appears to have had an inexhaustible list of contacts. Anthony Purdy, although writing prior to the defection of Philby and the opening of the KGB archives, asserted that Burgess was very good friends with Wolfgang von Putlitz, also a homosexual. Burgess may have even played a role in von Putlitz's recruitment as a

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[387] West, *The Crown Jewels,* 162.
[388] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 77-78.
[389] ibid, 78.
[390] ibid, 78.
[391] ibid, 79.

British spy.[392] Wolfgang von Putlitz was a German diplomat at the German Embassy in London and an agent for SIS.[393] KGB archives contained a British report stating that, in September 1936, "von Putlitz told [MI5] that war with Russia was 'as inevitable as an amen in church'."[394]

In December 1938 Burgess resigned from the BBC and, with the help of Footman, was formally initiated into MI6's Section D in January 1939.[395] He was initially asked by David Footman, on behalf of Colonel Valentine Vivian the head of SIS counter-intelligence Section V, to infiltrate the CPGB. Burgess refused.[396] Modin attributed this to Burgess's wounded ego, his inability to confront former Communist associates as a bourgeois civil servant.[397] It is also likely that he was afraid the arrangement would be disastrous since his old friend James Klugmann was the official historian for the CPGB and knew each one of the Cambridge Five members personally.[398] He was fortunate that his refusal did not garner suspicion from his secret service superiors.[399]

Burgess worked briefly at the Brickendonbury training center, which Philby joined shortly after.[400] This must have fueled MI5's suspicion that Burgess was responsible for Philby's entry into SIS.[401] Burgess returned to BBC in 1941 after Section D was absorbed into the Special Operations Executive.[402] In 1943 he befriended Dennis

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[392] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 55-56.
[393] West, *TRIPLEX*, 67.
[394] ibid, 68.
[395] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 62; Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 181.
[396] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 84.
[397] ibid, 84-85.
[398] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 294.
[399] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 85.
[400] ibid, 87.
[401] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 160-161.
[402] ibid, 85.

Proctor, private secretary to the former Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin. Through conversation with Proctor, Burgess learned about meetings between Churchill and Roosevelt regarding the 1943 allied invasion of Sicily and Operation OVERLORD, which he promptly relayed to the Soviets.[403] From 1941 to 1945 Burgess passed 4,604 documents to Moscow Centre.[404]

In 1944 Burgess transferred to the Foreign Office Press Department. His codename was changed to HICKS.[405] In the summer of 1944 he passed on a telegram from Duff Cooper (MP) to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden suggesting the need for a strong Poland as a buffer against the Soviets. Eden was adamant that a cooperative policy had to be taken with the USSR instead.[406] Nigel West revealed that in August 1944, Burgess was granted permission from his new boss to take documents home with him at night! This caused considerate anxiety for his controllers, particularly after Burgess managed to survive a dangerous incident wherein he drunkenly dropped a pile of top-secret documents onto the floor of a pub.[407]

On January 1, 1947 Burgess was selected to be the personal assistant to the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Hector McNeil.[408] He began to send UN and NATO documents to Moscow. When the four powers – USSR, Britain, the U.S. and France - met in London between November 6 and December 11, 1947, Burgess succeeded in copying a total of 336 Foreign Office documents.[409] Modin observed that

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[403] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 87-88.
[404] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 171.
[405] ibid, 171.
[406] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 172.
[407] ibid, 172-173.
[408] ibid, 101.
[409] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 174; West, *The Crown Jewels*, 178.

part of Burgess's productivity was due McNeil's laziness; it seems that he permitted Burgess to do the majority of his work for him.[410]

In the fall of 1947 Modin took over as Burgess's controller.[411] Modin praised Burgess for his faultless memory and gifted analytical capabilities.[412] This is rather remarkable since Burgess's drinking had increased to embarrassing proportions and he was rarely sober by lunchtime.[413] McNeil, however, remained a staunch ally of Burgess despite his inappropriate behavior.[414] Clearly he had a soft spot for his partying friend; it seems McNeil was one of the regular party guests at Burgess's Bond Street flat, along with Wolfgang von Putlitz, Anthony Blunt and a few other MI5 and MI6 officers.[415] Modin challenged that Burgess was starting to break under the pressure of his double life, but maintains that never once did he personally see Burgess drunk. [416]

In November 1948 Burgess moved to the Far East Department.[417] This remained advantageous for Moscow since he could relay British attitudes toward Mao Tse-tung.[418] He also sent documents pertaining to British assessment of USSR-China relations.[419] Burgess maintained contact with McNeil's colleague and diplomat, Fred Warner, who kept Burgess informed of NATO developments. Frequently Warner even handed copies of documents to Burgess, who had them photographed by Anthony Blunt and sent to his other controller in London, Korovin.[420] Markus Wolf, the head of Foreign Intelligence

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[410] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 130.
[411] ibid, 150.
[412] ibid, 152-154.
[413] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 65.
[414] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 167.
[415] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 108.
[416] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 165; ibid, 157.
[417] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 178.
[418] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 173.
[419] ibid, 181.
[420] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 178-179.

for the East German Secret Intelligence Service (the Stasi) for almost the entirety of the Cold War, articulated how NATO intelligence contributed to the prevention of an escalation in East-West tension.[421] In his autobiography, *Man Without A Face,* Wolf introduced NATO employee Rainer Rupp, who secretly passed intelligence to the Communists for seventeen years.[422] He said "without [Rupp], we [the Stasi and the Soviets] would have known less about NATO and feared it more."[423] "[Rupp's] decision to share NATO's secrets with us contributed to the climate of détente."[424] Perhaps Burgess's NATO documents had a similarly beneficial effect.

Burgess's behavior continued to deteriorate. He struck and killed a man with his car while on holiday in Ireland, but his powerful friends were able to protect him.[425] July 28, 1950 he was sent to Washington D.C. as Second Secretary to the Ambassador.[426] For someone who so desperately hated America, this was a cruel joke.[427] He had physically assaulted colleagues on more than one occasion for "liking Americans."[428] Suffice to say, until his defection Burgess had never been suspected as a double agent by British security services for the sheer fact that he was so indiscreet.[429] When Burgess arrived in Washington, Philby agreed to let him stay at his home until he found an apartment. Those "few days" lasted for over a year.[430] It also spelled disaster for Philby's career.

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[421] Markus Wolf, *Man Without A Face: The Autobiography of Communism's Greatest Spymaster*, (New York: Public Affairs, 1997), xi; ibid, 334.
[422] Wolf, *Man Without A Face*, 333-335.
[423] ibid, 334.
[424] ibid, 334.
[425] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 180-181.
[426] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 184; Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 182.
[427] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 10.
[428] ibid, 180.
[429] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 34.
[430] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 275.

Once Philby was aware that MI5 and the FBI were searching for HOMER, it was decided that Burgess should return to London, warn Modin and ensure Maclean's defection to the USSR. [431] The only inconspicuous way to get Burgess back to London was to have him dismissed from the Embassy. His behavior in Washington was already offensive, but in February 1951 he picked up a male hitchhiker and intentionally succeeded in being stopped for speeding three times in one day, all the while flashing his diplomatic badge. On April 18, 1951 his superiors recalled him to London.[432] He arrived in London on May 7, 1951 and on May 25 he and Maclean took the midnight boat to St. Malo, France. [433] Something went wrong along the way - Burgess was not intended to defect, only to chaperone.[434] Yuri Modin hinted to Borovik during an interview that Burgess had expected to return to London after assisting Maclean, but was not permitted to leave once he reached USSR territory. And Philby, refusing to believe that the NKVD had tricked Burgess and betrayed his own career, elected to blame Burgess for the remainder of his life.[435]

As much as Guy Burgess hated America, he disliked Russia just the same.[436] Upon their arrival in Moscow, he and Maclean were subjected to months of arduous debriefings.[437] Modin, who became closer with Burgess after his defection, recalled sadly Burgess's reluctance to accept life in Moscow. [438] He had little to do in the Soviet Union, which was largely the fault of the KGB for not utilizing him, so he resorted to

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[431] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 277.
[432] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 197-199.
[433] Purdy, *Burgess and Maclean*, 104; ibid, 121.
[434] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 283.
[435] ibid, 284-285.
[436] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 13.
[437] Doder, "Of Moles and Men", 9.
[438] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 253; ibid, 245.

reading, drinking and entertaining young men to occupy his time.[439] He was admitted to the hospital at the beginning of 1963 for liver problems and died on August 19, 1963. Despite Burgess's desperate requests Philby refused to visit him in the hospital. He bequeathed his library, his most dependable companion in those last few years, to Philby. Philby did not even attend the funeral. Guy Burgess's ashes were sent to England, the home he had never intended to leave.[440]

ANTHONY BLUNT – The Man in MI5

Anthony Frederick Blunt was born on September 26, 1907 to a devoutly Evangelical family of modest means but strong family connections.[441] His father, Arthur Vaughan Stanley Blunt, was an Anglican priest and his mother was a relative of Queen Elizabeth II.[442] A friend credited Blunt's zealous devotion to the Cambridge Ring to his strict upbringing.[443] It seemed to be a logical continuation of his metamorphosis; he seemed intent on developing into the antithesis of Blunt family values as a "fiercely anti-religious, actively homosexual" young man, who drank, smoked and defied his parents' moral codes.[444]

As a young student at Marlborough in 1934, Blunt found refuge in Clive Bell's message "that art was a superior alternative to religion."[445] In 1926 he received a scholarship to Trinity College where he began his studies in Mathematics and later

[439] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 251.
[440] ibid, 256.
[441] Carter, *Anthony Blunt*, 1.
[442] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 128; Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 66.
[443] Carter, *Anthony Blunt*, 17.
[444] ibid, 17.
[445] ibid, 33.

changed to Modern Languages.[446] As with Maclean, Blunt's father passed away while he was at Trinity.[447] In his autobiographical report requested by Moscow Centre in 1943, Blunt recalled his distinct lack of interest in politics.[448] At Cambridge, Blunt embarked upon an affair with Guy Burgess, to whom he would remain a devoted friend for the rest of his life.[449] As indicated earlier, Blunt facilitated Burgess's entrance into The Apostles and his introduction to Maurice Dobb and Kim Philby.[450] It was Burgess, however, who managed to convince Blunt that art, Marxism and Socialism were intertwined and intrinsic to society.[451] The events in Germany in the mid 1930s helped to persuade Blunt that he could no longer sustain his isolated anti-political bubble and he became convinced of the "Marxist approach to history" and to art.[452] The turning point for Blunt was the Hitler-approved, SS massacre of Ernst Röhm and the SA during the Night of the Long Knives on June 30, 1934. Blunt was in Germany at the time. Hitler accused Röhm of "homosexual depravity" and the sexual freedom that had existed under the Weimar government instantly vanished.[453]

The Spanish Civil War in 1936 was "the climax of Blunt's love affair with Communism."[454] In January 1937 Burgess organized a meeting between Blunt and his Soviet handler, Arnold Deutsch. Blunt was deeply impressed by Deutsch.[455] Deutsch admitted he was also impressed with Blunt's education and intellect. However, he also reported less complimentary details such as, "looks very feminine" and "a pederast...cold

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[446] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 67.
[447] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 128.
[448] ibid, 129.
[449] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 2.
[450] ibid, 67.
[451] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 70-71.
[452] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 130.
[453] Carter, *Anthony Blunt*, 115.
[454] ibid, 152.
[455] ibid, 179,

and a little mannered."[456] Yet regardless of Deutsch's suspicion that Blunt "would hardly give up his career for the sake of our [NKVD's] work," Anthony Blunt was swiftly christened as the newest of the Cambridge agents and codenamed TONY.[457] As an influential tutor at Cambridge he was tasked with recruiting from amongst his most promising left-wing students. In 1937 he personally recruited Michael Straight and Leo Long and introduced his pupil, John Cairncross, to Burgess.[458] Straight returned to America after his studies and broke contact with the Soviets in 1942.[459] Leo Long, on the other hand, proved to be a great source of intelligence for Blunt during the war.

Blunt spent from 1937 to 1939 as a talent spotter while working to shed his Communist attachments.[460] He joined the army in 1939, but was so miserable at his post in Belgium that he petitioned two of his closest friends, Guy Burgess and Victor Rothschild, to devise a means to get him excused from duty.[461] Presumably Rothschild used his family contacts because Blunt was soon back in London sharing a flat with Burgess.[462] When Anatoly Gorsky arrived as their new contact in 1940 he was horrified to find two Soviet agents living together, but Blunt and Burgess refused to change the situation.[463]

There was a point before the war started when Burgess, Philby and Blunt questioned their alignment to the Soviet cause. Modin recounted a meeting between the three men following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: they found it difficult to fathom that the Soviet government, with whom they had united in the crusade against Fascism, had

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[456] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 133.
[457] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 133; Carter, *Anthony Blunt*, 180.
[458] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 130-131.
[459] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 76.
[460] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 133.
[461] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 81; ibid, 83.
[462] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 83.
[463] ibid, 85.

unexpectedly become Hitler's most recent collaborator. They opted to conclude that this was a minor detour on the road towards worldwide revolution.[464] After all, Burgess was the one who had informed Stalin of the backhanded negotiations between Britain, France and Germany in 1938.[465]

On September 16, 1939 Blunt was summoned by the Director of Military Intelligence to participate in an intelligence training course at Minley Manor. This was preparation for joining the Intelligence Corps.[466] Colonel Shearer subsequently removed by Blunt on the basis of his connections to the Communist society at Cambridge.[467] Questioned about these associations and his voyage to the USSR in 1934, Blunt assured the Deputy Director of Military Intelligence that his involvement with Marxism was purely intellectual.[468] Blunt's argument worked and he was reinstated by the War Office on October 14, 1939.[469]

In June 1940 Anthony Blunt was introduced by his friend and current MI5 employee Victor Rothschild to Guy Liddell, chief of the B Division at MI5.[470] "Blunt made a particularly strong impression" on both Guy Liddell and Dick White, and by March 1941 he was chosen to be Liddell's personal assistant.[471] Nigel West emphasized that Liddell trusted Blunt entirely.[472] During his first few months in the D Division, Blunt gained access to Military Intelligence documents.[473] He did not officially begin to pass papers to the Soviets until January 1941; one of the earliest included a debriefing of

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[464] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 81-82.
[465] ibid, 79.
[466] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 134-135.
[467] ibid, 135.
[468] ibid, 132.
[469] ibid, 143.
[470] Carter, *Anthony Blunt*, 250.
[471] Carter, *Anthony Blunt*, 256; West, *The Crown Jewels*, 129.
[472] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 154.
[473] Carter, *Anthony Blunt*, 268.

the Soviet defector, Walter Krivitsky.[474] The NKVD consequently assassinated Krivitsky in 1941.[475] It also appears that Blunt caused the demise of Agent Aleksandr S. Nelidov, a Russian émigré who confessed in 1940 to two decades of employment by the SIS.[476] Nelidov had worked alongside the likes of Captain George Hill and the notorious British Spy, Sidney Reilly.[477]

Blunt was commissioned by MI5 to study the Security Service's surveillance techniques and to produce a report on weaknesses and methods for improvement. This report was, of course, immediately sent to the Soviets.[478] His work was so well received by MI5 that he was assigned to analyze information obtained from captured German spies being assessed for use as double agents to be controlled by the XX Committee.[479] A May 1944 NKVD Report entitled *British Deception Schemes* demonstrates the sheer extent to which Blunt betrayed Guy Liddell's XX Committee to the Soviets.[480] In September 1940 Liddell set about organizing an intergovernmental body to oversee the use of double agents.[481] The XX system, or "double cross", was developed in November 1940 and John Cecil Masterman was appointed chair of the supervisory Twenty (XX) Committee.[482] The XX system involved capturing German agents sent to the UK and convincing them to work as double agents for British Intelligence.[483] Blunt was also

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[474] Carter, *Anthony Blunt*, 268.
[475] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 122.
[476] West, *TRIPLEX*, 250-251.
[477] ibid, 252-260.
[478] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 90-91.
[479] ibid, 91.
[480] West, *TRIPLEX*, 279.
[481] Crowdy, *Deceiving Hitler*, 52.
[482] ibid, 68-69.
[483] West, *TRIPLEX*, 274.

elected onto the TORY and TWIST Committees, designated to develop deception schemes and disinformation to be used in conjunction with Liddell's double agents.[484]

The TWIST Committee consisted of ten members, including XX Committee chief Masterman, who were responsible for developing elaborate deception schemes for use by the military.[485] One such example was Operation MINCEMEAT in which they dropped a corpse dressed in a British naval uniform off the coast of Spain in 1943. They had planted on him highly classified letters between General Nye, General Alexander, General Eisenhower and Admiral Cunningham. Their content was intended to divert German suspicion away from an Allied invasion of Sicily that summer.[486] The TORY Sub-Committee was used to create false rumors and Blunt was responsible for spreading these through "MI5 agents in the diplomatic corps and foreign journalists in London."[487] By the end of the war it was clear that MI5 had indeed succeeded in controlling the entire German network in Britain.[488] Jack Curry wrote in the *Official History of MI5*, "in the Second World War the situation changed completely with the establishment of Camp 020;" this was the camp where captured German agents were interrogated.[489] The NKVD reports in *TRIPLEX* confirmed the Soviets were well informed of the structure, procedures and personnel of each of these committees, as well as details on top-secret allied operations such as MINCEMEAT, BARCLAY and OVERLORD.[490] Moreover, on May

[484] West, *TRIPLEX*, 273-279.
[485] ibid, 276-277.
[486] West, TRIPLEX, 276; ibid, 287.
[487] West, TRIPLEX, 278.
[488] ibid, 93.
[489] ibid, 92.
[490] ibid, 273-298.

26, 1944 Blunt handed the Soviets a copy of the "entire deception plan for OVERLORD."[491]

Blunt also worked within a smaller unit under Dick White, which focused on counter-intelligence against diplomatic missions and embassies in London.[492] Blunt passed on copious amounts of information about personnel working for SIS and MI5 within foreign embassies. These were, and still are, extremely sensitive documents and they remain classified in Britain today. For instance, one report addressed to Blunt from an MI5 employee named J.G. Dickson dated April 19, 1945, opened with the following request: "I would be very grateful if you could destroy it [the report] as soon as possible."[493] The document contained detailed profiles of British agents and informants within the Brazilian, Persian, Swedish, French, Turkish, Lebanese, and Dutch Embassies and the French Independence Agency.[494] Although names were omitted, descriptions such as the following would have provided sufficient information to identify the individual:

> "Spanish Embassy: The agent is a footman, thirty-eight years of age, who was recruited by us in 1944 and has been at his present post for only a few weeks. His reputation is known to you; he speaks Italian, Spanish and very fluent French…"[495]

A testament to Blunt's tenacity, he was able to convince SIS to allow MI5 access to intelligence extracted from diplomatic bags.[496] Soon he was one of the few officers

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[491] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 168.
[492] ibid, 145.
[493] West, *TRIPLEX*, 24.
[494] ibid, 24-25.
[495] ibid, 25.
[496] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 140.

supervising the XXX Operation, XXX referring to the illegal removal of material from diplomatic bags belonging to neutral missions in London. This was TRIPLEX, and the material obtained was sent directly to Moscow by Blunt.[497] From the TRIPLEX material SIS and MI5 were able to determine that "information reaching Stockholm or Madrid reaches both the Germans and the Japanese."[498] By identifying the channels through which the intelligence was leaking, MI5 set about supplying "certain attachés and heads of missions with misleading information."[499] In some instances, however, the informant was too great a liability and efforts were made to remove them from London. One such example was that of Swedish Naval Attaché, Count Johan G. Oxenstierna, "who was quietly removed from his post at the request of the British government at the end of 1943."[500] Oxenstierna had been using his position and influential family name to elicit top-secret naval intelligence from officers and Wrens (Women's Royal Naval Service).[501] Neutral attachés were greater security risks for Britain because they were less suspecting - officials and civil servants were "more inclined to speak freely to [a neutral attaché] than to someone who [was] hostile to the Allied camp."[502]

Anthony Blunt also provided the Soviets with a list of the various materials used by MI5 to acquire information about foreign diplomats and their activities.[503] The report incorporated the possible use of these materials after the war and the likelihood that certain agents would continue working in peacetime.[504] The six sources of intelligence were as follows: BLACK JUMBO (BJs), TRIPLEX, Special Material, Special Facilities,

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[497] West, *TRIPLEX*, 1.
[498] ibid, 13.
[499] ibid, 13.
[500] ibid, 5.
[501] ibid, 6-7.
[502] ibid, 12-13.
[503] ibid, 19.
[504] ibid, 19-24.

Domestic Agents and Other Agents. BLACK JUMBO referred to intercepted diplomatic communications.[505] TRIPLEX was correspondence extracted from neutral diplomatic bags. TRIPLEX was expected to disappear as a source after the war because air travel would be less restricted and there would be less opportunity to separate the bags from their couriers.[506] Special Materials alluded to telephone and room bugs and Special Facilities as switchboards. Both were deemed dangerous during the war and even more suspicious after the war.[507] Domestic agents generally held "servant" positions and were most valued for gathering "contents of wastepaper baskets, which [gave MI5] either valuable documents or material useful for breaking ciphers."[508] Some were willing to continue to work for more money, but many hoped to leave for more secure and better-paid employment.[509] The rest of the report contained a list of "Other Agents," those in higher and typically temporary posts at the embassies who had begun to work for MI5 during the war. These agents' profiles not only detailed their position, gender and a brief history of employment, but they also included their codename.[510] All of this information was sent directly to the Soviets. MI5 post-war diplomatic surveillance methods must have been of great interest to the USSR, especially since a 1943 report from Blunt illustrated British sentiments towards their current ally:

> "The Bolshevik danger…we cannot risk Russia occupying the entire German territory…" [511]

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[505] West, *TRIPLEX*, 20.
[506] ibid, 20.
[507] ibid, 20-21.
[508] ibid, 21.
[509] ibid, 20-21.
[510] ibid, 22-24.
[511] ibid, 15.

TONY's former recruit Leo Long (RALPH) was likewise of great service during the war.[512] He was employed by the War Office and had access to Bletchley Park and the Government Code and Cipher School.[513] He provided a great deal of information regarding German military strategy in the USSR. He had access to War Office materials, but he also passed a great deal of ISOS and ULTRA intelligence.[514] All of this information was sent directly through Blunt.[515]

As an authority on MI5 counter-espionage in London, Blunt was looked to by the Soviets for the domestic counter-intelligence equivalent of Philby's information on SIS XK operations overseas. Moscow refused to believe that MI5 and SIS were not planning anti-Soviet measures.[516] In another NKVD report on *MI5 Surveillance of Foreign Diplomatic Missions*, the author concluded, "we have not received from TONY, or from our other sources, any serious material on MI5's operations against Soviet establishments."[517] Blunt had tried to reassure them that MI5 was utterly consumed with the prevention of intelligence leaks to the Nazis.[518] He informed Moscow that MI5 only had the capacity to cover 40 telephone lines at one time.[519]

Moscow's receipt of Jack Curry's *Official History of MI5* from Blunt in 1945 should have alleviated their fears.[520] Firstly, the copy received by the KGB, and only published last year in West's *TRIPLEX,* is still highly classified in Britain. It was released through the Public Records Office after the war, but had been heavily censored.

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[512] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 155.
[513] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 94.
[514] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 155.
[515] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 94.
[516] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 147.
[517] West, *TRIPLEX*, 316.
[518] ibid, 5.
[519] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 150.
[520] West, *TRIPLEX*, 3.

This is the first time the original version has ever been released.[521] The History includes the creation of MI5's Section 6, which was formed after the Russian Revolution in order to combat Russian espionage.[522] It explains the various counter-intelligence methods used during WWI and their successes and failures. One such instance was the use of women by MI5 because they found that "women were less likely to fall under suspicion…at home and abroad."[523] Jack Curry relished the fact that the entire German network in Britain had been exposed at the start of WWI due to MI5's "secret opening of mail."[524] They obtained additional intelligence from "German official sources…attachés, diplomatic and consular officials, and officers and officials making official visits, as well as from officers and scientists sent on secret missions."[525] With regards to the Munich Agreement in 1938, Curry asserted that "all this information on the German plans for Czechoslovakia and preparation for the war was passed on to the Foreign Office, the Home Office, SIS and the DMI."[526] Therefore, Stalin could have assumed from this report that the Chamberlain-Hitler negotiations were representative of the British government's opinion as a whole and not just an isolated conspiracy. Curry's account also illuminated divisions between SIS and MI5 such as their hesitancy to share "material obtained from secret sources…[thus] hindering co-ordination and comparison and creating more opportunities for errors and omissions."[527]

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[521] West *TRIPLEX*, 3.
[522] ibid, 34.
[523] ibid, 50-52.
[524] ibid, 50.
[525] ibid, 39.
[526] ibid, 71.
[527] ibid, 99.

In the time Anthony Blunt worked for MI5, from June 1940 to October 1945, he provided 1,771 documents.[528] At the time of his retirement, Blunt was Assistant Director of the B Division.[529] In April 1945 he was offered a position as Surveyor of the King's Pictures, which he readily accepted.[530] According to Carter, "the royal family liked him: he was polite, effective and, above all, discreet."[531] In 1948 he also accepted a job at the National Trust as their first ever picture adviser.[532] Blunt had little difficulty acclimating himself to the old-boy, nepotistic ways of the British elite.[533] By that time Blunt was largely disenchanted with the Soviet government and found Moscow's foreign policy antiquated and imperialist.[534] On occasion Blunt did act as courier for Burgess, however, and escaped a close call when he was stopped on the street in 1949 carrying a bundle of documents.[535] Otherwise he remained relatively inactive. Blunt remarked, "if danger of exposure arose he would try to flee to Paris or would commit suicide."[536] He was rightly nervous and used his connection to MI5 to help monitor the safety of the group.[537]

Blunt was kept well informed of the plan for Maclean's defection and it was he who suggested the use of the midnight boat to St. Malo.[538] Following their defection, MI5 asked Blunt to acquire a key to Burgess's apartment, at which point he took the opportunity to remove any incriminating evidence from the flat.[539] The only piece he

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[528] West, *TRIPLEX*, 5; West, *The Crown Jewels*, 170.
[529] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 170.
[530] Carter, *Anthony Blunt*, 304.
[531] ibid, 308-309.
[532] ibid, 328.
[533] ibid, 329.
[534] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 178-179.
[535] Carter, *Anthony Blunt*, 333.
[536] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 185.
[537] ibid, 185.
[538] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 205.
[539] ibid, 213.

missed was the letter they traced back to Cairncross.[540] Blunt was subsequently encouraged to defect by Moscow Centre, but he refused to leave London.[541] After Philby defected in 1963, Michael Straight betrayed Blunt's role in the network and Blunt was "offered immunity from prosecution and confidentiality, in return for a confession." [542] This avoided any further damage to the reputation of the Secret Services and to the royal family.[543] Another possibility was that the royal family played an active role in preventing Blunt's exposure; after all, he had just been knighted in 1956.[544] It was documented that Blunt retrieved some compromising letters from Germany on behalf of the royal family in 1945. The letters were said to contain evidence that the Duke of Windsor was a strong Nazi sympathizer and, in all probability, supplied Hitler with British intelligence.[545] To the chagrin of MI5, Blunt's original confession in 1964 contained little information of consequential value. Likewise, his offer to cooperate did not result in the exposure of any individuals who were not already under investigation.[546]

Ultimately, it was Goronwy Rees who prompted Blunt's demise. Diagnosed with terminal cancer in 1978, Rees gave Blunt's story to Andrew Boyle for his book about the Cambridge Spies.[547] Boyle replaced Blunt's name with 'Maurice' and, when questioned about the character's true identity, remarked that the revelation "was the government's responsibility."[548] On November 15, 1979 during an address to the House of Commons,

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[540] West, *The Crown Jewels*, 226.
[541] Borovik, *The Philby Files*, 307.
[542] Dusko Doder, "Of Moles and Men", *The Nation*, 18 February 2002, 3.
[543] Carter, *Anthony Blunt*, 447.
[544] Modin, *My Five Cambridge Friends*, 241.
[545] Carter, *Anthony Blunt*, 312-313.
[546] West, *TRIPLEX*, 2.
[547] Carter, *Anthony Blunt*, 468-469.
[548] ibid, 471-472.

Margaret Thatcher exposed Anthony Blunt as the 'fourth man.'[549] He and his lover John Gaskin were essentially forced into hiding by the media frenzy that followed.[550] Blunt was cast as a "treacherous communist poof," a "pedophile, a thief, a cheat," and "an arrogant evil poseur."[551] In 1980 Gaskin threw himself from their balcony but survived.[552] Then, in July 1988 he threw himself under a train.[553] According to records, Anthony Blunt died at home of a heart attack on March 26, 1983.[554]

Blunt's 30,000-word memoir was finally released in 2009 after having been vaulted for a quarter of a century in the British Library. It had been handed over to the library in 1984, one year after Blunt's death, with strict instruction that the manuscript was to remain a secret for 25 years. The document, hoped by some to have been an enlightening confession, has been dismissed as a self-indulgent lamentation from which few new details can be gleaned. Most intriguing was that, fifty years after his recruitment by the NKVD, Anthony Blunt had chosen to inform the world that his decision was: "the biggest mistake of my life."[555]

CONCLUSIONS

The question remains: how did these five men affect history? For as much intelligence as they provided, to what extent did they radically alter Soviet policy? How did they influence British and American policy? John Lewis Gaddis put it well: "how much trust can we expect Stalin to have placed in the reports of a Burgess, Maclean, or

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[549] Carter, *Anthony Blunt*, 472.
[550] ibid, 477-483.
[551] Doder, "Of Moles and Men", 2.
[552] Carter, *Anthony Blunt*, 487-488.
[553] ibid, 498.
[554] ibid, 496.
[555] John F. Burns, "Memoirs of British Spy Offer No Apology," *New York Times,* 23 July 2009.

Philby?"[556] Is intelligence only as useful as the interpreter? In Sheila Kerr's analysis of Donald Maclean, she argued that: "the KGB have not revealed how Maclean's material was checked, processed and sent to Moscow."[557] Therefore, will it ever be possible to quantify the impact of their work?

The tangible Soviet reactions to Burgess's intelligence about the Munich Agreement in 1938, to the Tiger Tank documents passed by Cairncross in 1943, and the German Ambassador's telegram from Tokyo provided by Philby in November 1941, prove that the Soviets trusted and utilized these sources. But how can we determine whether or not the Soviet intelligence system was even capable of handling the overwhelming quantity of information received?[558] And what about the long-term effects? What about the type of intelligence that does not garner immediate or visible results? Of the thousands of documents supplied during the war, did any have compounding effects? An obvious effect of the Cambridge Five was the result of their exposure, not the intelligence they supplied: the defections of Burgess and Maclean drove a wedge between the United States and Britain, hindering future cooperation between their Secret Services.[559] During the period when the Cambridge Five were in operation, the British Executive and its Intelligence Services were inextricably linked. To understand one, you had to understand the other.[560] Has trust and morale been recovered at Whitehall?

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[556] Gaddis, "Intelligence, Espionage", 202.
[557] Kerr, "Investigating Soviet Espionage",112.
[558] Doder, "Of Moles and Men", 9.
[559] Gaddis, "Intelligence, Espionage", 207.
[560] Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2002), 8.

Admittedly, certain areas within the KGB archives have yet to be opened and many British files continue to be tightly sealed, so there is a good chance that elements of the Cambridge Five legacy remain a mystery.[561] It is certain, however, that the release of *TRIPLEX* and the recently revealed documents within will inspire a new wave of research into impact of the Cambridge Five and their contributions to Soviet intelligence.

[561] Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand,* 8.

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